

THE 21st-CENTURY CITY AND ITS VALUES: URBANISM, TOLERATION, AND EQUALITY

October 1, 2004

SESSION 1: URBANISM

Alan Brinkley: Good morning. I'm Alan Brinkley; I'm the provost of Columbia University. I want to welcome all of you to this symposium, "The 21st-Century City and its Values: Urbanism, Toleration, and Equality." This is one of the final two symposia of a series of such events that we've had here at Columbia since the beginning of Columbia's 250th anniversary year, a year ago. This is the final weekend of our anniversary, and I can think of no more appropriate way to bring this celebration of this great event at Columbia to an end than with this inquiry into the nature of the twenty-first century city. Columbia is of course one of the great urban universities, and so it's appropriate that we should consider this very important question.

We have an extraordinary group of scholars and architects and others here today to talk with us about an issue that anyone who's traveled almost anywhere in the world will understand is one of the most pressing questions of the twenty-first century: What is happening to the city? What challenges does that pose, not just in the United States but all over the world—perhaps especially in other parts of the world? This extraordinary transformation of urbanism is something that was a preoccupation of Americans and Europeans a century ago, and we are experiencing a similar transformation today, which is similarly important. So I'm very pleased that we're able to gather so many great people here today to discuss this question. I want to thank all of you for coming.

And it's now my great pleasure to introduce Hilary Ballon who will moderate this morning and introduce the other participants. Hilary is professor of art history and archeology here at Columbia, formerly chair of the Department of Art History, one of the organizers of this event, along with Ira Katznelson, whom you'll see this afternoon. And I'm particularly grateful to both of them for doing this. Ira worked on organizing the symposium last year while serving as vice president for Arts and Sciences, and Hilary did so while serving as chair of her department, so we really are grateful to them for adding this to what was already a very busy schedule.

Hilary Ballon is a scholar of modern architecture. Her publications include *Frank Lloyd Wright's Towers, New York's Pennsylvania Stations*, and other books. She's also one of the most honored teachers at Columbia. She's received virtually every conceivable teaching award here at the university—the Presidential Award for Outstanding Teaching, The Great Teacher Award, the Philip and Ruth Hettleman Teaching Award—almost embarrassing, but a great tribute to her tremendous impact on students here at Columbia. So it's really a pleasure for me to welcome her, one of Columbia's great scholars and one of its greatest teachers, Hilary Ballon.

Hilary Ballon: It's worse than embarrassing. You see, it raises the expectations. It's that John Kerry problem.

I just want to salute Ira Katznelson with whom I organized this symposium and with whom I had the great pleasure of working on it for about a year. You'll see him later this afternoon.

"The 21st-Century City and its Values: Urbanism, Toleration, and Equality." Our symposium has a premise. It begins with a claim that diversity is a constitutive element of the city. Because people of different faiths, races, and viewpoints live in close proximity in the city, their differences are brought into pointed contact. They may collide and conflict, merge or melt away, fracture the social fabric or make it stronger. The heterogeneity of the city makes it a place of peril and potential, a place that tests the human capacity to coexist in harmony with those unlike ourselves. And because of this concentration of difference, certain values are especially critical to civic life. Our symposium puts three values on the table: urbanism, toleration, and equality—values which are fiercely tested and forged in the city and which we deem essential to the quality of urban life. Toleration and equality are the afternoon topics; this morning our subject is urbanism.

Now urbanism may not strike you as a value. The term is sometimes used loosely to encompass whatever building activity occurs in a city. So I should say what it means to construe urbanism as a value. The word is relatively new. The *Oxford English Dictionary* cites its first usage in 1889, but it was sufficiently unfamiliar in 1929 that the *Times* of London referred to urbanism as a newly coined word. *Urbanism* then passed into common parlance in conjunction with the rise of the planning profession, and it signified the work of professional planners. *Urbanism* has since lost this close connection with professional planning, but it still implies actions and building projects designed to organize and improve the city. Undirected growth or wanton development are not urbanism in the sense that we mean because *urbanism* implies a conscious effort to shape the city and make it a more habitable place, however that goal may be defined, and it assumes that the spatial character of the city is not a passive backdrop to the play of social forces, but participates in and affects urban life. In short, urbanism seeks to manage the challenges of concentrated urban living through physical interventions.

The city as we know it, American and urban models, may hardly matter at all in the twenty-first century. Explosive growth, especially along the Asia-Pacific Rim, has brought about new forms of cities, often called megacities. They are characterized by enormous size, extreme density, and building projects at a vast scale. The urbanized areas in China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and elsewhere are expanding beyond the ability of governments to provide adequate housing, clean water and air, and basic

infrastructure. In the next fifty years the urban experience of the majority of the world's population will more closely resemble the urbanized areas of Asia than the cities of the United States and Europe. China already has 166 cities with a population over 1 million, compared to nine cities in the U.S. And cities in China are growing fast and creating extremely high densities. How do we cope with this intensive urbanization? What planning models are appropriate for these emerging cities? And how do you humanize super-density and make such a city livable?

Giant cities, cities commanding a large territorial region and possessing concentrated wealth and power, are not new to history. Aristotle said that Babylon had the "compass of a nation" rather than a city. Alexandria, ancient Rome, nineteenth-century London also come quickly to mind. But however far-reaching the impact of those historical cities, they had a center and definable shape. The loss of a center, of centrality, and the rise of an unbounded spreading field of urbanization has been a theme of twentieth-century criticism. Indeed the mid-century writings about megalopolis seem relevant to discussions about the megacities of our new age.

The English urban planner Patrick Geddes introduced the term *megalopolis* in 1927 to describe what he viewed as overgrown cities. The word was picked by Jean Gottmann to describe the urbanized northeastern seaboard from Boston to Washington [D.C.] in a 1961 book he called *Megalopolis*. Gottman ultimately had a positive view of the spread of urbanization: "This particular type of region on the eastern seaboard is new," he observed, "but is the result of age old processes, such as the growth of cities, the division of labor within a civilized society, and the development of world resources. And this symbolizes the long tradition of human aspirations." He saw the city as a source of wealth and ideas. In the words of Jane Jacobs, whom I must invoke since she's smiling at us on our programs, "Without cities we would all be poor." Lewis Mumford had an opposing view of urban expansion. He viewed the city as a biological organism with natural limits.

"Megalopolis," he wrote in a 1962 essay, "is the breakdown of the most fundamental of all organic limitations, the functional limits of growth. When hamlets, villages, suburbs and cities, that is communities at different scales, fuse in a seamless conurbation distinct forms of social life are destroyed, like animal species that become extinct." To Mumford, megalopolis meant, "the annihilation of man." In his words, "the effacement of human culture." The megalopolis debate raises a question, not to be addressed today, about the structural similarities and differences between the urban growth we observe in the Pacific Rim today and intense urbanization in previous times. It also frames the issue of economic expansion versus human culture, which is a central question to urbanists.

Meanwhile, American press coverage highlights the design of glamorous buildings in China, the super-tall towers, Olympic facilities, and other monuments by famous Western designers, while I read on the Web [that] the *China Daily* questions China's reliance on foreign architects. What may not be clear to an American audience familiar with the more circumscribed role of architects here is that the mad pace of development in China gives architects a particularly weighty role. Rem Koolhaas's book in 2001 on development in China includes this striking definition of the Chinese architect: "The most important, influential, and powerful architect on earth. The average lifetime construction volume of the Chinese architect in housing alone is approximately three dozen thirty-story high-rise buildings, designing five times the

project volume of an American architect in one-fifth of the time. For a thirty-story residential high-rise it takes a Chinese architect seven days to finish the design and complete a set of drawings. A project of similar scale requires two to three months in an American architectural office." We have experts later who can attest to the degree this comment may be hyperbole or not. In any event, the expanded opportunities of architects makes it all the more urgent to ask what concepts make sense for the organization of urban life under conditions of hyper-density and super-growth? Do old models devised for different spatial patterns apply? How, in the face of extreme development pressure, do you respect, not destroy, the environment and preserve the tradition of historical architecture which connects a society to its past? Do planners even have the capacity to control this fierce growth?

Here's just an example. Shanghai is sinking. It is sinking at a rate of 1.5 centimeters a year. The financial district dropped 3 centimeters last year. The problem is aggravated by the need to tap water sources deep underground to provide Shanghai's 16 million people with clean water, and by the crush of construction. About 2,000 skyscrapers are reportedly in the planning stages. If they are built, the fear is the construction will cause more subsidence and threaten the subway system. One response to the problem has been legislation to restrict building height, like the zoning law that New York pioneered in 1916. Now some say this is default thinking. "The Chinese are learning the worst lessons from Americans," an American architect active in China told a reporter. Height restrictions, they argue, would encourage sprawl and destroy historic neighborhoods. Concentration is wiser.

Our speakers today have confronted these issues head-on and will present different ways of thinking about these urban issues, about super-density, enormous scale, and the urban conditions of the twenty-first century. We begin with Yung Ho Chang, a global architect par excellence. He is based in Beijing and a native of Beijing, the founder of the Graduate Center of Architecture at Peking University, and an American. I just learned he can vote in America. Where he should vote is a crucial question. He has taught in a number of American universities, and he recognizes that architectural education is an especially urgent matter in China where the lure of high-tech modern has endangered the great tradition of Chinese architecture. In his own practice, Yung Ho Chang has wrestled with these issues and found a way to both respect the past and to modernize. Please join me in welcoming Yung Ho Chang.

Yung Ho Chang: Thank you, Hilary, very much for your introduction, not only of myself as a speaker but also of the onslaught of urbanism in China. So that was part of my speech you've already given.

Anyway, first of all I have to say that I haven't done any thirty-story residential towers; however, I am a practitioner, an architect. I have been practicing in China for the past ten, eleven years. So I do like to take on a number of issues relating urbanism through a three-year project in China. And before I start to show the project, one comment I'd like to make is that urbanization, this very rapid urbanization, does bring a kind of an uncertainty really to the way people live, or people should live, or people could live, in China. It opens up the Pandora's box as to new lifestyle and so on, so that I don't really think urbanism is only about space or about the physical environment, but really is this question of how people would inhabit space and time. And that's why perhaps I see urbanism as a way to program.

So the first project, in fact, what we see is, what we have done is programming the landscape. And the project is outside of the city of Huinan, which is south of Shanghai, in an area which is wetland. And 40 percent of the land in fact is covered by the water. By a typical Chinese convention, a standard practice, will be [to] fill up all the wetland, the lakes, to make it a flat, solid pack. And meanwhile, of course, all the trees will be bulldozed, along with whatever else will be on there. So this making of tabula rasa is to me one of the greatest threats to the environment, to the ecology, and to our culture really, while making the new cities. And this kind of a city built upon the tabula rasa is what I call a flat city. In fact—I'm sorry, I'll backtrack later—I'm going to pick out three points. All of them are conventions of part of the Chinese urbanism. And then today I'd like to say one more time, because we have done that many times to the developers and the planning bureaus, that you can be certain and be wrong. I picked that up last night.

So here is the site map. As you can see it's quite legible. The darker blue is water as well as the lighter blue. This is more like a river system, and this is more like lakes. And again the common practice, in fact our neighbors, the other related developments, were all filling up, leveling the land and filling up the water area. So we decided the question really is not so much of conservation of the ecology because economically the development has to be part of the conservation; that's the only way to make it work. So really the challenge, the question is, Can development of certain density and the protection of nature or natural elements be balanced? So we developed a particular strategy which is shown here only in Chinese, but we thought there were six very important elements. This is the water, circulation, vegetation, and this is density. I'm really sorry about this particular logo we used. And building, and this is ecology, the Tai Chi sign. And the idea is that they are the most critical elements on the site. We wanted to study all of them in pairs in all the time so that with the hope we would develop a balance of these critical elements.

And then you can see this is water and circulation, and this is water and the ecology, water and density. And then, of course, building, and the vegetation, and the waterway are considered as equal throughout this process. And then building with water, and building with circulation, and so on.

So rather, I think it was very important. This is something we did like four years ago, this methodology. It's about design-as-analysis. So here you see it might look like a design decision. In fact it's a way for us to really understand what's there and what could be done. So here deals with water and density. The density again is buildings, but it could be just vegetation. And of course it's the density of human activities, and so on. So we have then the densities of different areas. Here is with more ponds and lakes, as well as more waterways. They are just the example of the research and studies we did, and more of that.

And then as you can see all the waterways—we're thinking if you're going to keep them, so potentially they could be a transportation system as it was before. What's really interesting for us is that the water was there all along, and then the local people, the southern people—because I'm a northerner in China—they actually had these traditions, heritage, of making water towns. So another question we asked is, Can we still make water towns with the kind of development and density we would desire today? So by the way, this project has about 200 hectares of land, and with a

floor-area ratio of 0.8. And then you can see here is the superimposition of the different layers, vegetation, different traffic. This is the pedestrians, that's for cars, and that's water, and this is a main waterway, and the lakes, and different buildings. And then here, of course, is vegetation all layered together. So for these projects eventually, of course, we had to propose a master plan which [is] based on the earlier analysis of the six elements. So here you're seeing an image of the other greenery. And here is the main scenery and views. And then here is circulation. There is a highway going through the site, as one of the existing conditions. And here are the different functions. Just [to] give you a sense, because I have 25 minutes—I have to rush a bit—but here is high-density walk-ups, you know, residential, here are the low-density villas, and here are the industries and work areas, and with a commercial center, and then also with some public facilities here and there, including commercial, and also educational facilities, schools, and so on.

And here is the height-control diagram. The highest and in fact the lowest, and the in-between levels. And then we connected all the watercourse, so [we] made this number, I think it's 13 islands. And so the watercourse now becomes a complete system, and then each individual island can be developed in its own way. Another thing we did is this notion of idea bank, so from the earlier studies instead of giving one fixed solution to an island, we say that it takes even in China eight to ten years to have this area fully developed. One fixed solution may seem to work, but if something, some factors, changes on the way that that solution may not actually work eventually. So the idea here is for each island morphologically we have different possibilities in case some fluxes would change so that a different alternative in fact is prepared. So the idea is, instead of a single idea, is we propose for each island and that would make a reservoir of potential designs. And then more of this notion.

So here I'd like to say that our office is relatively young, we have been in business for the past ten years. So what you can see here [is] not only that we have taken on some challenges, but also for ourselves there is kind of a process of becoming more mature slowly. This is a study of the population and how people would actually use the spaces, different people. And I show one example. This is like an executive type of person, and that would be during time[s] of day the places he would need to go, and the distance between all these points, and his relationship with all the spaces and other people as well. And here is the overall master plan.

So again the idea here is that we are trying to create a balance between the development and meanwhile protecting the nature to the extent that we can, or at least to the extent as our ancestors did. And this notion we consider as the topo city versus the flat city, so we are trying to keep the natural characteristics in such [a] city. The next stage would be the development of architecture. We're thinking of these high-density low-rise houses. Of course it's derived from the tradition of vernacular houses.

So the second point I'd like to make is entitled "Programming Time." It's also again about something China has been doing for the past almost two decades—and we think it's very problematic and actually very dangerous—is the making of [an] instant city. A city—again, I actually touched upon that before—is perhaps planned, but is only for the very near future, and then it's built in a rush. Once it's built, it starts to have all kinds of problems, not able to accommodate the changes. One of these

cities in fact is Shenzhen; it's a large city next to Hong Kong which is about 7 million inhabitants. So that city, if you go there, you wouldn't ever thought it was planned, but it was. But it's planned in a way which did not consider growth or evolution or time. So with this project, again, it's a residential area. In fact, Mr. Steven Holl here was also in the competition. So I'm going to give you some of the basic information about the project and then Steven could tell you his take, different way of taking on the project.

So we're given again about 200 hectares of land to develop as residential in this southern city of Nanning. It's the provincial capital of Guangxi, which is next to Guangdong province, so it's not that far from [the] Pearl River delta. And with the site quite near the city center, [it] is about twenty minutes by car to go from the city center of Nanning to the site. The site also is next to a big scenery area, a park, and to go to the center of that park would take again 25 minutes by car.

So the issue here is that the developer would like to have eventually about 1.2 million square meters of housing built in the time about eighty years. So for us the question of course is, [Is] that possible? And would that be the right strategy to go after the project? Let's take a look quickly at the condition of the project. I don't know if the English words there are legible, but anyway, this piece—rather quite beautiful peninsula has been destroyed to the extent that these huge, you may say, scars [are] left on the site. It's related to what I talked [about] before, because this notion of making tabula rasa is almost like a prerequisite for any development; the previous developer came in, just bulldozed the site to the extent you see here, and left. According to the rumors he was able to make a profit and left. That's such an amazement for me, but I guess it's possible, anything is possible for a moment in China. But everything else is a tremendous challenge.

And then this is [the] remaining topography, these pieces. Here is a little hill, a valley, and there's some water, and some vegetation along this river. And here are the water surfaces on this peninsula. And this is the flood line, so the flood would come up this much. And then we don't think we should build a hard embankment, so would rather let the flood come up to a certain extent, not as extensive as you see. So these are some of the conditions. This one is the distribution of the different cliffs, because of the leveling [that] happened before.

So our idea is that, first of all, we'd like not to say to restore the ecology or even the topography—I think that would be unrealistic—but to take on whatever the existing condition is, but maybe use architecture, use development, as a way, almost like a thread, to sew the damaged land and the remaining parts together. And the second idea has to do with not to see it as a flat instant development; we'd rather like to think there is a possibility to inhabit the land first as a park with a very low number of people only making a day trip, and then later becomes a resort. People will be there for a weekend or a little longer, and then eventually becomes a place people would take up residence. So these are the two ideas. So the remaining landscape features, we'd like to turn them into three empty cities. So the idea of the city in fact is being turned inside out, so that people would do well outside the city, so in all the three cities they will become parks. It's a park of the castle of the peak because of the water and the castle of the valley.

So here are some of the basic circulation analyses and designs. So this is the main road [that] goes to the city center, and this is the public transportation system within the site. And these are all the roads and so on. And there's another thing with our design, with all the zigzagging of buildings. One of the goals we're trying to achieve is to have the maximum southern exposure of buildings, because in China there is a tradition, a culture, to really enjoy southern-sun daylight. So when people purchase homes, that's one of the criteria they are quite concerned with. That's a distribution of different functions. So I'm not going to go into it because when I talk about the facing I will touch upon that too. So here are the notions of facing. As I said earlier, from a park to a resort, and then to a residential community.

So the first stage we suggested [was] to build buildings only along the river, and as few points. These buildings are public buildings, and it's like park facilities with commercial and a little residential, but in forms more like hotels, to bring people up here to visit. So they are placed where the best sceneries are. And then so it's along the embankment, along the river, and at the existing geography and topography. And then you see it slightly better. So buildings are designed into the embankment, and some buildings are serving as almost like vista points, and so on. We will draw inspirations from the tradition of making water towns also from paintings. We do research as architects; quite often it's very visual instead of textual, I guess. And then here you see the different sections. It's all about how part of the embankment would become buildings and people can inhabit the embankment.

And so the second stage, the castle town would be completed with apartment buildings so that the population at this point will go up, and makes this peninsula as a resort; people would be here to spend weekends.

And then for the third stage—oh, I'm sorry. I forgot to say something important. At the very first stage except [for] the small number of buildings, we planted bamboo to reconstruct the vegetation for the entire site. Bamboo grows very fast in this area. It takes a couple of years for bamboo to grow to full height. It's like 3, 4, even 5 meters high. So the recovering of the landscape feature was very important. So when we got to the third stage, we started to cut the bamboo out, and then plant houses in. It's like making little clearings in the bamboo forests. And then it's making these negative spaces for the houses. So these areas are where the houses are, so in a way they are really like suburbs of these castle towns. There's something I know Steven will criticize it, because we discussed that before. And it's kind of a—it's a problem I'd like to discuss more.

So at this point, what you can see here, How do these people travel or commute? What is really the role of cars in people's life today in China? I think they are also very important questions. We have newly coined middle class. We have a very recent really phenomenon of property ownership, which was confirmed by the state recently, actually only earlier this year. And of course there is a rise of private cars, not in Nanning so rapidly yet, but in Beijing the number is shooting up. And nobody knows, even the planning bureau doesn't really know, how many cars we have. But usually the number they quote is from six months ago, meaning that it's already obsolete. So very roughly for the city of Beijing we have about 2 million private cars already.

So what I'm showing here, as you can see, is not so much about urbanization; it really is about suburbanization. So itself, it is a big, big question. I don't think we have answers, but really it creates a tremendous problem for China: habitat in general. But our point here for the moment is at least we can see a city or a community not as instant as probably what has been done, but rather as a city which would evolve, which would grow. So instead of an instant city, so perhaps we can build an evolving city or a growing city. So there are the different castle towns, and then the edge condition around it has been defined by various architecture and programs, and always drawing inspirations from the past. So the water town, actually we designed it for more commercial purposes.

This is the last stage, which is about making courtyard houses out of the bamboo forest. Bamboo forest now is—I hope it's a vivid image in everyone's mind after *Hidden Dragon, Crouching Tiger* movie. There are some new ones. It's the *House of the Flying Daggers* by Yimou Zhang. It's very entertaining.

And then you can see these three areas of houses being carved out from the bamboo: one, two, three. And some of the views of the study model we made, different zones in the valley castle, the peak castle from the north, or the water town.

So the last one is one we are currently working on. And unlike the other two, it fell through at one point or not, we don't even know. Sometimes in China there's a great uncertainty involved. A project may die anytime, but may bounce back anytime. So resurrection is a word we experience quite often.

The last project, however, is a current one. The construction started about two months ago. But it could stop, but for the moment we are very happy [that] it's going ahead. As you can see we are dealing with directly this notion of programming-use. Another problem, the third one, is this desire for a city of objects in China. Again, it's very popular to see city as a collection of objects, designed by foreign architects or not. It actually is not so important, but rather in our tradition we have these shelving with little compartments, and then you can display your traveling souvenirs, and antiques, and trinkets, and toys at home. The city in China is very much perceived that way by many and, again, technocrats from the planning bureau and the planners, architects, developers, and so on. So there's a whole set of regulations in planning to support that, to make a city with very wide boulevards and further setback, and then very low land coverage. Coverage is only 30 percent, and then each lot has to have 30 percent greenery and so it makes a city with these totally unrelated and detached buildings. And then people can't walk in the city, people can't really enjoy window-shopping and so on. I think that's a city really stripped of the basic urban pleasure, meaning they take away the reason people would like to live in the city.

And then we like to make a city of fabric instead of a city of objects. Now it's in Szechuan where the spicy food is from. It's about 50 kilometers from the provincial capital Guangzhou. R. Klein, who's a very typical, very young, but he has a tremendous collection of artifacts and artworks from the Cultural Revolution in the sixties and early seventies, and also a collection of artifacts from World War II. And then through a lot of discussions we had with him, the idea came to build a town for people to live and work, but with a core of museums in the center of the town to

accommodate his collection. And this is where we are based, Beijing, and that's the provincial capital Guangzhou, and then the town of Anren. When the freeway is completed later this year would be about half an hour away.

This is the old town, and these are some of the big manors, and this is like ranches also, of the local rich in the past. And here is the new site, which used to be a fish farm. And then the tradition of fabric are still there to some extent. Actually you do see new buildings built in eighties and nineties in the back. And these are some of the typical images of the town. A lot of construction going on like all the cities in China. And then the historic streets with covered walkways in different ways. Of course the scale is more intimate. And these are the typical vernacular houses we surveyed, more of that. And how people would have commerce. For your information, that's a shop selling mobile phones. Everyone has one now. Young people, they would change probably four phones every year, just to get the latest style. And this is a video-game arcade in the middle, and billiards.

And here are the major circulations from the old city to our new town, which is entitled Museum Town. And parking facilities. In the study of the urban spaces and the traditional streets and alleyways and manors and mansions and so on. And this is a study of the potential numbers of tourist who will visit this town. There's a lot of interesting things there. There's really the most famous sculptural piece made during the Cultural Revolution, it's called the "Wren Collecting Yard." It's there, it's still there, and intact.

And then the number of square meters needed eventually. I'm going, I guess, slow here. And again some calculations. And here is a more in-depth study of the quality of the traditional streets. And then what we have done, we collaged the traditional streets, or the urban spaces, and houses directly onto the site to give it a definition of spatial quality as well as scale. And then from there on we developed our master plan. So the red line represents the route for all the museums, for the Cultural Revolution. The blue line is for the World War II line.

And here is the master plan. So we saved these clusters of farmers' houses while developing a center, town center with museums, and the residentials, and commercials. So there's a very important notion which we also borrowed from the heritage, from the tradition, is mixed use. So the cultural, the residential, and commercial are always together. And then that would actually give a life to the town. And this is all the ways of different streets. Streets are narrow. The local cars can go in. The visitors have to park there and change to a transportation system of bicycles, and tricycles, and bicycle taxis, and so on.

And these are a detail of the street design, and the study model. And these are the design guidelines to hand out to all the architects involved in the projects. Since our client collects everything from the past, one hundred years of Chinese history, we decided to invite four generations of Chinese architects to be involved in the projects, designing different museums. The oldest one is 88 years old, but he's not the oldest architect China. The oldest one now is my father, who is 92. The youngest one is 33, so we have four generations, each taking on not only a museum but also some fabric of commercial and residential. And the Japanese Pavilion is designed by Arata Isozaki. So the only regret I have, I wasn't able to recommend a good American architect, the reason being that a Los Angeles architect promised my client

a tank from World War II, so my client was bribed to the point that he had to take him.

Proposals by different architects. So there is no object except a bridge crossing the river, which is a museum of posters from the Cultural Revolution that is designed by the master planner, which is us.

So this is the end of my presentation. I think it is a very open-ended presentation. There are far more challenges and really problems and opportunities in China at this point in terms of urbanism. I understand both my fellow panelists, they're going to discuss also projects in China, so I'm happy just to open up the discussion.

Thank you very much.

Hilary Ballon: Steven Holl, a faculty member of Columbia's School of Architecture, is one of the most creative and acclaimed architects at work today. It is rare for an architect to bridge the worlds of academic theory and building practice as effectively as Steven has. He's a man of ideas and a maker of breathtaking forms. His recent buildings include Simmons Hall, a dormitory at MIT; the Loosium Visitors Center in Austria; and the Museum of Contemporary Art in Helsinki. He is now working in China and we're going to hear about that current work right now.

Steven Holl: I need your patience for technological adjustment here. It's an honor to be part of this symposium, and I titled my talk "Working With Doubt: Unforeseen Urbanism." And Yung Ho stole my "you can be certain and be wrong." But working with doubt, I've used this term in a book I wrote about five years ago, and I think more than ever when I try to do something in China I have to use this very carefully.

Let's see if I can get this to come up.

I'm just going to show three projects, but I just preface it with this conundrum of not speaking Mandarin and never having been in China before. I went to Nanning—my first trip to China was to Nanning—and then also then to Beijing to lecture for Yung Ho. And so I'm trying to, let's say, rid myself of all my general theory, but I have to sort of honestly admit this sort of manifesto from a long time ago, that architecture should stem from a clear idea, and that idea is a force to drive the design. It should really be tested not in an intellectual way but in the phenomenological experience of the thing, whether it's a success or not.

When I came to China for the first time, and this is the Nanning project on the left, the brief is for a town of 9,000 units of housing—27,000 people will live there. I have to say that for me I didn't have anything that I'd worked on that compared, that I could even think about, except perhaps some work I did as sort of manifestos against sprawl in America, like the Edge of the City project in Dallas. These are *Spiroid Sectors*, the idea of erasing suburban sprawl, connecting pedestrian city sectors with rapid transit. So maybe this is a little bit of an a priori I bring to this project, and that might have set my competition entry very different from Yung Ho's.

I tried desperately in the short three months or four months that we had to do the competition to learn as much as I could, and I was lucky to be collaborating with Lee Hu, who was born in Beijing and can read Mandarin, so whatever we're looking at he

could tell us stories about. This is an early map of Nanning, this very special town. And my first thought about this peninsula—and I'm glad to follow Yung Ho because you've heard the whole story, the failed development, the two mounds that are left—but my first thought is to link it to the core of the city with a line of rapid transit, an electric-train system that would allow this new town to come into being without depending on the automobile. And you know it's not that far.

You can see this is the view from the site to the town, which is full of postmodern skyscrapers, like so many other cities, sprouting and sprouting—over a million, right, Yung Ho? So this is one of—I thought that was very interesting what Hilary said in the beginning, 166 cities over one million—this is one of them, a town I'd never heard of before we were invited to go there, and I was fascinated by it. But I think for me the real crucial question is how to propose new development without depending on the automobile. I think that this sort of—not only the dependence on the automobile, but the entire sort of petroleum-based economy—I think that this is a nightmare of America that we have to work ourselves out of; it's a nightmare of developing cities in Mexico, and it could be a nightmare in China. I think China has the potential to be a place where you could really test new and radically different propositions. And so this whole project then rests on building this transit link back to the city.

And these are the things that Yung Ho spoke about, the shape of the peninsulas there; the wiped-out mounds, flattened and muddy; and the remaining landscape. And our project develops from my first sketch in the old town of Nanning to see these wonderful streets with shops below and mom and pop living upstairs and a courtyard in the back, and I thought, "Why couldn't this be a twenty-first-century morphology, a real pedestrian street, a real possibility of a mom-and-pop computer shop, or whatever it could be?" OK, maybe it's working with doubt. I saw that. That was the most exciting thing for me was that morphology, and I thought, "You know, if we made a master plan, if we could propose this transit link, these things could be done by other architects." We don't know exactly what they would be but the proposition is to save the two green mounds and to actually go around them in a linear town, which is really made up of two typologies, this low rise and then seven mountains—I call them *cultural mountains*—which would stick up and have different qualities. One would be a kind of shopping center, one was to rebuild this monastery, this Buddhist monastery that was there. So these would all be done by different architects, but they would all have a 60-meter-square envelope. So this would be the basic morphology, which would be completely connected to the river for evaporative cooling. It would be a tropical housing section, really taking solar power, units that would be transformed by the people that lived in them. Really it's a kind of framework to be transformed by its inhabitants. And that making up the basic frame, and then these 60-meter cubes, seven of them, they would be built gradually and by different architects, but inside of those frames with different functions. All the roofs would be green. You could see back across the river. And the link, the crucial link, to make this work is to not depend on the automobile.

The second project is in Nanjing, where we were invited to be part of an architectural exhibition called The Practical China architecture exhibition. Yung Ho is also part of it. Twenty-one architects were invited, and we were invited to do the architecture museum. I put this in because first of all I'm showing only three projects I did in China, but it's making the point to start with a clean slate with a site and

circumstance, and with the question of a doubtful beginning. And the thought was first of all to discover this town, this Ming Dynasty capital, and see these wonderful old stone walls. And I believe this town is about 3 million, a population of about 3 million. It's quite large, it's growing. Ford Motor Co. is building out here some factories. But there's a great old structure of this town. And I was mesmerized by it, built in black bricks. Ming Dynasty is what year, Yung?

[Inaudible]

The fragments of these old walls are really absolutely fascinating and really part of the morphology of this city. And this is our exhibition. And my inclination was somehow to link back from this exhibition site, which is a totally suburban kind of site, all set in the landscape, back to the old structure of this fascinating city, which has the greatest restaurant on earth. I happen to be a vegetarian and there's a monastery there where the nuns serve you the most amazing vegetarian food, so I really recommend you go to Nanjing if you're in China. There's a great museum there with an amazing jade coat of armor. I don't know what that's called. I've only been there three times now, but I cherish going back. There are just amazing things in this place, which I have to admit I'd never heard of before I was invited to work on this.

So one of the things that I used as the beginning point—and I say that each project is a new, a fresh territory for an idea that drives the design, an idea that's related to the site and circumstance—and one of the things that I've always been fascinated with is Chinese painting, parallel perspective, where there is no vanishing point. And even after the Chinese were introduced to Western painting with a vanishing point, they didn't employ it in their paintings, they continued with this parallel perspective. Yung Ho actually helped me, sent me a series of key paintings. I measured the angles and realized that it's either between 28 and 35 degrees this angle, and I was doing a very elaborate Eisenmanesque analysis of how to put the perfect angle on the project, but I relied more on sort of first sketches on the site, and that was to build the museum itself as a kind of morphology of parallel perspective and then to top it out with a piece which would really be a kind of entrance piece but also look back to the city.

This is an interesting detail. I imagine that's going to go on through the rest of the symposium.

So you can see basically a very low building which contains all the galleries, bamboo will be the lined, the forms. Actually the bamboo that's growing on this site is the proper diameter to cut into thirds, and those will line the form work so the actual black and concrete will have this bamboo work which came from the site.

And the upper gallery. It's the first architecture museum dedicated to contemporary architecture in China. It's very small, it's 25,000 square feet, and I was very nervous that they will never have the proper curatorial staff, so I put in a curator's apartment with a beautiful garden. I've had trouble with my museums. I have a museum in Seattle that's, you know . . . the trustees walked away and they're blaming the architect. It has nothing to do with the architecture. So I'm very concerned about curators and trustees and this type of thing because I know that a building is just a dumb thing, and there are all these other more important things. So I thought for

this, they didn't have a director, and I said, "What I'm going to put there is a great apartment, and I'll live there myself if they don't get a director."

So this is the sort of top gallery that flies like a lantern. It's really made out of lightweight polycarbonate panels, so it glows at night. And as you move through—it's a sculpture and model gallery—as you move through there's a little teahouse, and that end view is that view back. This is the main gallery. Of course that's a different lecture. And as you move through you slowly unwind and the last view you can see from that vantage point that's the actual perspective of the city of Nanjing.

And that actually is breaking ground in November. They're going to start building it with the drawings unfinished. They say, "Don't worry, we just start." It's very interesting working there.

I had more than seven days to do this design. This is my last project. And I tell you the project . . . talk about working with doubt, this really frightens me, this project. I was working down there on that little museum and I got an e-mail, would I mind coming to Beijing and consider doing eight towers 22 stories tall? And I said, "Well, you know, I mean, send me a plane ticket if you're serious," and they did, so I took the hour-and-a-half flight to Beijing, I arrive on a Sunday night at 10:30 at the airport with Lee, and a white Mercedes picks us up with two guys with white gloves, drive us to a hotel, and say be ready at 9 a.m.

It's a long story. But I've been working on it seven months, and it's very central, you know, I mean this is an incredible site. Here's the Forbidden City, from like the sixth floor you can see into the Forbidden City practically, on a clear day. And this is the Olympics way up here. Most of the projects are out beyond the third ring road. This is the second ring, so this is a very—it's like being on Fifth Avenue in Manhattan. And of course my head man on this project, I'm really collaborating with Lee Hu who was born in Beijing, he knows everything about Beijing. He knows about that dust storm that comes in March, he knows better than having balconies. All my sort of previous knowledge about making apartments I have to sort of bracket and try to understand it from his mind, so I have to say that it's not just me thinking about this. I'm really working together with him through a mind of someone who grew up in Beijing who's very aware of the problems.

And I was just there last week, stuck in traffic. They say today that if you want to do something during the day in Beijing you can only do one thing, because if you have to go across the city, you can't go across the city twice in an eight-hour day. And the smog was terrific, I mean it was amazing, it was terrible, it was like Mexico City. So I think that our project, which is this idea of an autonomous place that you can live, you can work, you can buy all your groceries, you can get everything you need, you never have to leave this sort of quarter. By the way, this is 728 units of housing, so there's going to be about 3,000 people living here, and they're going to build it all at once.

This is a diagram of the way Beijing has been for thousands of years. Of course the *hutan*, the courtyard housing, develops out of the restriction that you can't see into the Forbidden City, and also the big super-blocks. Now everything has changed, private developers are tearing down all these wonderful old courtyards, building point towers isolated at the base, and that's basically what this developer wanted to

do. He wanted eight towers, he wanted a gated community, and no mixed use. So we proposed something quite mixed and quite different. I said, "What's really important is everything aside from the apartments that you offer, the shopping that you offer, the possibility of recreation, and the live-work mixture that you offer." And I thought to make—because it's set at 22 stories, that's the zoning envelope that we were given—to really make another loop at around the twentieth floor with a lot of other functions, like spas and teahouses, so that you really can experience the site in three dimensions, a really sectional euphoria. And when I presented it, the client compared it to Matisse—this is the client's comparison here, not mine—and I said, "Fine, you know, however you want to understand it, it's fine."

I mean what's really interesting—and this is the shock—is that I accepted this completely doubtful about whether [it would work]. I mean basically I had inherited a zoning diagram with eight towers, and these heights were fixed, not the shapes and certainly not the bridges. So I tried to radicalize it and make it the most interesting because it's super dense already, to make it the most interesting dense quarter that I possibly could, fully feeling that they would never go for it. And when I presented it on the 14th of January, they just said, "We want to build everything just as you drew it." Then I really started to get scared because some of these spans are really kind of, you know, not easy. And Guy Nordenson is helping with the bridges. We've got them down now, the cores are actually working. There's a swimming pool in a bridge suspended between these two towers.

Another thing that's interesting about working with the Chinese is the value system for ecology and thinking about the future, the twenty-first century. It's really a pleasure to work with people in a private development company that really care about these issues. This project is going to be the largest geothermal housing development I think ever in Beijing. There are going to be six hundred geothermal wells drilled at a grid on 5 meters that are going to provide 10 kilowatts of cooling per well.

By the way, the other project, the Nanjing project, is also geothermal. The wells there are drilled out in the parking lot and they provide 2 kilowatts per well of cooling power. So I mean it's amazing that we're using a gray-water system. We have a large pond I'll show you in a minute that's the centerpiece, that's using a very complicated gray-water system that allows all the water of this pond to be recycling out of the gray water and filtered. In the wintertime when this is not requiring more water, there's a redundant secondary system that allows it to use the gray water for toilet flushing. There's about—I could go on, I could just present the green issues on this project, it would take an hour. It's amazing. We're using Transsolar out of Stuttgart because we couldn't find anybody in New York that could sort of keep up with this sort of aspiration. And I think Cosentini is helping us, but it's really an exciting—that part of it is really exciting. And then also the sort of mixed functions. All of these shops service the community, but the whole project is open to the public.

I wanted to engage one of the things that I love about ancient Chinese architecture: the polychromy. Having experienced a bit of it, I always was fascinated by the undersides, the eaves, and the way there's this incredible polychromatic ecstasy. And so these buildings, all the undersides of the bridges, have a powder-coat aluminum color. There's the pool, if you can imagine swimming on the twentieth floor in a bridge looking out over the city of Beijing. There's a landscape idea which

has to do with cycles of life—a mound of childhood, a mound of adolescence, a mound of middle age, a mound of old age, and a kind of infinite mound. There's the childhood mound. It's required whenever you build a project this big—the government required a 25,000-square-foot kindergarten—so this is our kindergarten, which is also part of the landscape and knitted into the sort of arrival.

The project's totally open, of course, to the public, so for me it'll be on the level of Rockefeller Center, where it's a private development but really has public aspiration to create a public space. The sort of landscaping is merging with the great water garden in the center, and you can see that water garden really provides views all around the project, and especially at night. And the sort of centerpiece where they wanted to keep a rather ugly old factory building, we decided, we just sort of said, "You can't keep that because looking down on that would really be depressing." We put at the core of this two cinemas, a kind of cinemateque on the level of Anthology Film Archives, where the films will be projected in a kind of mist from the water on the outside of the frame of the buildings. There's a one-hundred seat, an eighty seat and a two-hundred seat. And there's a hotel which is the first link in the loop, so you can control that with a concierge, and there's the café from the hotel.

So the project really for me is, you know, what Hilary was saying in the beginning in her introduction, is how to humanize this super-dense development. And I have to say that I'm very excited about this. And by the way, we're working on this and we have had seven months to design it instead of seven days. I think architecture takes time, by the way.

You know, Rem's kind of gloss on the Chinese architect is slightly cynical. I think if you're going to do something you really need to work it out from every angle and from every aspect, it really does take time. But I believe we can do it in seven months, we're really breaking ground supposedly, they say, on March 1, so I'm really excited about this. And I'm excited about their acceptance of the possibility of a real twenty-first-century living, where all these different functions coexist with the 728 apartments that we're building, large apartments, some of them 200 square meters, some of them 250 square meters. And when I presented this the last time in March—Modern Group, which has a very charismatic president, Zhang Lei, who very seldom comes to the presentations, but when he does what he says is very important—and I presented this and I took, you know, sort of much longer than I'm doing today. We ended with this film, and I had all the hopes of all these different aspects aside from the housing that I'm putting in there. And by the way, they required 800 apartments. We were only giving them 728. If you did that in America the developer would fire you and hire another architect to give you the other apartments. So when I finished this Zhang Lei got up and in Mandarin said, "What's important here is the spiritual aspect. We know we can sell all of these apartments." You know, it's like being on a different planet.

So I really am having a very joyful moment, but I'm very cautious and I'm very doubtful. Like Yung Ho said, it can stop any minute. But we have like 15 people working on this, building models kind of seven days a week and we're working on this, getting ready for the March 1 groundbreaking. And I hope it really proceeds. And I hope that this can contribute in a positive way an intensely human feeling of living in a dense new development.

Thank you.

Hilary Ballon: She's cool as a cucumber even when technology lets her down.

Marilyn Jordan Taylor: The dreaded restart.

Hilary Ballon: But I'd nominate Marilyn Jordan Taylor as the quintessential urbanist. She's just stepped down as the chairman of Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill and continues to run the international practice there in urban design and planning. She's had a hand in virtually every important urban planning project in New York in recent years. Her projects include the East River waterfront master plan, the reclamation of the Con Ed East River sites for mixed-use development, the new Pennsylvania Station, and lucky for us President Bollinger had the wisdom to hire her to work on Columbia's Manhattanville master plan. Transportation infrastructure is Marilyn's watchword in the cities around the globe, including Hong Kong, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and elsewhere in Asia. She's worked on master-planned airports and connected transportation resources to inner cities. Today she's going to talk about her work in China as well. Marilyn Jordan Taylor.

Marilyn Jordan Taylor: Thank you everyone. Sorry for that restart process. Hilary, thank you so much for the introduction, and thank you also to Provost Alan Brinkley and to the conveners for the invitation to participate in the symposium. It's really a privilege to be here.

Yung Ho and Steven have given you great views and extraordinary insights on design in a very uncertain world. I'll add to that. I think it would be interesting to watch how the slides and how our stories and how our experiences weave together.

Meanwhile, before you on the screen, courtesy of satellite photography and architect and urbanist Richard Rogers, is Tokyo. Today and through at least the year 2015 the city counted as the world's largest, a striking form, an extraordinary man-made place, visible from space, one of three world cities I'd like us to consider as I begin my comments.

From all aspects and points of view, the city is clearly one of man's most extraordinary creations, as we see as we visit Shanghai. Going to Shanghai is exciting and more often than not exhilarating. The pace, the sense of adventure and risk, the imperatives of the future all hover in the air, in the streets, and in the steps of those seeking a change in fortune by virtue of being a participant in city life. Had we, however, visited New York's Lower East Side but a century earlier, the scene would've held many of the same elements. A few decades after this photo, writers engaged in the Depression-era preparation of the *WPA Guide to New York* captured this sense of vibrancy and the mythology already developing around New York. "The rumor of a great city," they wrote, "goes out beyond its borders to all the latitudes of the known Earth."

Shanghai may be to the twenty-first century what New York was to the twentieth, yet our city, New York, remains extraordinary. As Kenneth Jackson, professor, writes, "Americans need New York because New York is one of the few places in the country that allows difference to be celebrated, that allows people to reach their full

potential. . . . New York is really the hope of the future because it's there for all of us. Whether we never go there, whether we never see New York"—imagine that—"whatever small town or small city we're from, it's important that we know that New York is there to welcome us in case we want to be different."

Three cities: Tokyo, Shanghai, New York. Has Tokyo been, can Shanghai become, of similar importance and value to their countries and to us as individuals in the face of change?

I'm going to talk for a moment about urbanization. Today we face an increasingly urbanized globe. Our use of energy creates in space a beautiful portrait of the interlinked networks of cities and production centers. As projected by the United Nations in its assessment of world-urbanization prospects, this is the decade and 2007 is the year in which for the first time the number of urban dwellers will equal the number of rural dwellers. My other planning partners and I in SOM enjoy communicating this to the architectural design partners as we see our moment coming.

Within a very few years, by the year 2015, 36 of the world's cities will hold populations greater than 8 million. The global distribution of these cities clearly indicates the emergence of India, China, and Asia as the focus of the supersize city. In comparing the list of megacities from 1994 with the projected list for 2015, several observations can be drawn. Tokyo remains at the top of the list, New York drops from second to eleventh, Mexico City drops from fourth to tenth but surpasses New York, Los Angeles drops from seventh to seventeenth, and of the sixteen other top-twenty megacities, eleven are in Asia, two are in Africa, one at the boundary between Europe and Asia, and two in South America. Clearly the world in 2015 will not be the world as we have known it, but will its cities be essentially different?

I'd like now to consider six essential characteristics of twenty-first-century cities. The emerging cities of the Asia Pacific offer extraordinary opportunity to advance our fascination with one of mankind's great creations, the city itself. Since the earliest times of urban development, cities have been founded, formed, and glorified to provide a stage for leadership, showmanship, governance, dominance, religion, trade, education, culture, architecture, and ambition. For the most successful of these, trade, global commerce, has been an essential component, an important lesson for the global cities of tomorrow.

Let's consider the characteristics that will define the leading cities of the early twenty-first century. The extraordinary pace. This image refers literally to the quickness of the lives that city dwellers live, but also the rate of change in the district streets and spaces they inhabit. Such rate of change may be unsustainable over the longer term, but in the shorter term it is nothing less than astounding. Is the expression on this man's unrevealed face one of disbelief, dismay, or excitement?

Second, the extreme density. We think of Hong Kong . . . sorry, rate of change. The extreme density. We think of Hong Kong, seen here from the peak and Kowloon, as epitomizing high-rise, high-density life, a sacrifice of space for proximity and for the economic opportunity that proximity in the right place can bring. But this density is arriving in Midtown New York. Should we resist? Not according to Professor Jackson,

whose view is that with density come the diversity, tolerance, and opportunity that make New York a beacon to the world.

Third characteristic, "object architecture." The third essential defining characteristic of the leading cities of the twenty-first century is the utilization of object architecture. What is object architecture? For purposes of our discussion today, let's define it to referring to those buildings and groups of buildings that are designed to stand apart from their surroundings, to express their difference, their role as exception from the normative forms around them. They come in many forms, those are generally quite large ones, such as Koolhaas's winning proposal for the CCTV headquarters in Beijing. As urban propositions they are neither inherently good nor bad. That judgment can only be made based on time, place, and degree of excellence involved. In fact, two of the Olympic projects project a sense of beauty and meaning, although it remains to be seen if and how they will be realized. Living in doubt.

Commercial object architecture risks holding itself apart from the very marketplace on which it demands. The residential object architecture, as in this Beijing example, can be read as strongly gated and exclusive, exempt from responsibility to community. It creates the superblocks that will ultimately disconnect urban dwellers from each other and from the transportation systems that can contribute to sustainable urbanism.

These objects can be things of beauty and even of magic or symbolic power. But as we have learned, or continue to relearn in our own cities, object architecture can also deny the very urbanism that brings it into being. Roland Barthes offers one way out of the dilemma that would seem appropriate to China—at this moment, according to the *New York Times*, "the biggest single patron of avant-garde architecture in the world." His message: "The skyscraper establishes the block, the block creates the street, the street offers itself to man."

Fourth characteristic, leaping ahead here, infrastructure under stress. Redefinition of infrastructure is required. A Western notion of infrastructure regaining currency is that infrastructure is the responsibility of government, of the public sector. But the cities of the twenty-first century will need a greatly broadened range of services, water, sewer, energy, transport, but also education, open space, and perhaps even culture and the arts, as well as the means to put a roof over one's head. If public infrastructure is the precedent to private investment, China's huge infrastructure program will create an opportunity for expansive economy. The Yangtze River dams are just one example of the infrastructure expansion the Chinese are leading. Similarly cities such as Singapore that build transportation and transit in advance of demand, before congestion boils over, stand to reap huge rewards.

Environmental challenge. Industrial economies and those in rapid change often overlook the environmental damage they are causing. Concentrations of people occurring in advance of plan or resources for investment overrun the systems of water, sewer, air, and transport. Lack of commitment to sustainable design prolongs the damage and can lead to irreparable harm. The cost of environmental responsibility struggles in the midst of other priorities.

Sixth and finally, global position and wealth formation. The important twenty-first-century cities occupy privileged positions in global trade and with it the opportunity for formation of new wealth. In the context of this discussion it may be tempting to object. It's as easy to see the dark side of the twenty-first-century city, uncontrollable size and growth, as it was to portray Dickensian England. But there is another side, the economic advantage. As the *Economist* magazine describes, ". . . China has witnessed probably the most dramatic burst of wealth creation in human history. Its income per head has increased sevenfold . . . : more than 400 m people have been lifted out of severe poverty. Along its seaboard, and down the length of the Yangtze River, a middle class, perhaps 100 m strong, has been created, where none at all existed before. Visit Shanghai, and you are visiting one of the most dynamic and cosmopolitan cities on earth." The *Economist* continues, "'To get rich is glorious,' Deng said, and everywhere people are doing just that." The question is, By whom and to whose benefit is wealth accumulated?

With these characteristics in mind and these issues in mind, and holding urbanism as value, let's now turn to the questions posed for discussion in this session. From my comments so far I hope that it is clear that I do not agree that the cities of the Asia Pacific differ greatly from their mega-counterparts on the continents of North and South America, Africa, and Europe, but all represent significant challenges to planners, urban designers, and architects. Working only at the scale of the 10-meter storefront or of the single building gives us neither the scope nor the perspective to meet the challenges. What can design do?

I'd like to use just a few examples of our firm's recent work in Asia to help formulate strategies for planning and design of twenty-first-century cities. Just as I often introduce myself as the SOM partner who has never done a high-rise building, I join Yung Ho and Steven today in focusing on examples that more directly confront and extend the value of urbanism.

The first of these is Saigon South. The strategy is infrastructure redefined. By the mid-1990s Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, faced the challenge of growth. But rather than let the historic city be overrun and overwritten, the government of Vietnam sought and ultimately endorsed a different answer. They looked south to areas along the river and canals and proposed the creation of a new urban center developed in parallel with the historic city center and treated as an integral element of the city overall.

In the course of a design competition and follow-on work that involved Koetter Kim and Associates and Kenzo Tange Associates—we keep crossing each other's paths, all of us—SOM proposed a city of islands and prepared a master plan for its implementation. The new city stretches more than 6,500 acres along a 17.8-kilometer Saigon South parkway. It begins and continues at urban density. Its early phases are located close to the historic center and adjacent to the Tan Thuan Export Processing Center and deep-water port. As the first island achieved significant development, activity moves to the next. The land between allows for flexibility in accommodating the mix of uses the marketplace, government policy, and open-space demand together support. Saigon South will ultimately be home to 1 million people, a capacity which is achieved by using a mix of housing types and densities.

But the character, the place of this new city, comes from its setting. The new development builds around and across the city's network of rivers, canals, and waterways. Repairs to the waterway network will result in a reduction of pollution and restoration of water quality. Together with extensive parks along the river edges they become the community's open-space elements. An infrastructure for agriculture and transport is recaptured as a formative amenity. Planned infrastructure systems specifically address ways of living and working, including cultural, educational, and recreational facilities to meet an international standard of quality, yet in a very specific and local landscape.

This project is being implemented over time through a joint venture between the municipal government and its Taiwanese partners. Clear government priorities, objectives, and investments in broadly defined systems of infrastructure have channeled growth to a planned city that supports the continued health of the historic center.

The second project I'd like to show you is one called Xintiandi, an innovative neighborhood at the heart of an emerging urban district, Taipingqiao, in the former foreign-concession area of Shanghai. The strategy is bringing the past into the future. SOM developed the master plan for our client, the development company Shui On Group, led by the remarkable Vincent Lo. Other architects and planners have been, and will continue to be, involved in the subsequent planning and design commissions that are seeing the project realized. The master plan concept was based on a district development pattern rather than a quarter pattern, which is the prevailing pattern in most Chinese cities today.

The 1.6-million-square-meter development consists of an historic preservation district for tourist and cultural areas, high-density local housing, expatriate housing, community services, retail entertainment centers, corporate headquarters, and office buildings. The innovation in this plan, however, begins in the creative reinterpretation of strict and standard Chinese urban planning requirement. Aggregating open-space requirements for each city block creates extensive open-space network with a clear hierarchy of major, minor, and connecting elements between green spaces within and adjacent to the area.

Interpretation of the current planning code's open-space requirement typically results in a Corbusian-style setting with buildings in a park. But by aggregating the requirements for each block, a major park could be created to provide much-needed open space in this dense urban area. In addition, neighborhood-scaled spaces and block courtyards accommodate leisure and recreational needs.

Acknowledging the need to accommodate higher densities, this plan advocates including lower pedestrian-scale buildings in high-rise area to moderate the impact of tall buildings, rather than eliminating the *hutongs*. Common interpretation of current planning-code requirements again—those for building spacing and sunlight access—tend to result in tall buildings in a park, creating a setting that's totally foreign to the city itself as well as to those coming.

This plan successfully promoted preservation and the reuse of historic buildings to revitalize the area and conserve the city's unique buildings and urban fabric, a European-Chinese eclectic style of townhouses. The revitalized preservation block is

the first successful historic conservation project in the city, and has become the model for conservation in Shanghai and China.

"Xintiandi . . . signifies the future of this city," writes the *New York Times*, "and is the first neighborhood to be completed in a 128-acre . . . master rehabilitation plan. . . . 'Xintiandi has successfully given Shanghai not just a nice development and nice buildings,' said Albert Chan, general manager of Shui On Group. 'It has somehow given Shanghai a new lifestyle, a way of life not possible before it was born.' Chan continued that more than fifteen other Chinese cities have approached Shui On to develop their own versions of Xintiandi." Here I would add replication is not the objective, although perhaps leading by example is.

A few more scenes of a street life rarely seen in areas of redevelopment. Chongming Island, the third project, a master plan again, again a competition, is one where the strategy is what I would like to call sustainability beyond the scorecard. We cannot achieve our goals for sustainable design if we only focus on scoring sheets on individual buildings. And this is an attempt by our partners to act very differently.

Let's see if I can find the pointer here. That might help a little.

Chongming Island is this piece immediately to the north of the settled area and the dense area of Shanghai. It is the fifth administrative district of the Shanghai municipality, but presently in very low-intensity, low-income farming. It contains some 500 square miles. It's larger than Cape Cod, larger than the Napa [and] Sonoma valleys, but like them an opportunity to retain natural resources and to create more intensified agriculture in direct proximity to our urban areas.

In our proposed plan, urbanization will occur, but in the form of eight cities linked by transportation. Concentration creates opportunities for the retention of the environmental resources in the center of the island. It creates opportunities for organic farming to serve the growing demands of the nearby city and to increase the economic return on the use of the land. Within the farms there are opportunities not only for green systems of water usage, but also for green villages, for life at a very different scale. The island is tied together by numerous forms of transportation that also link it back into the metropolitan region, creating an overall development strategy that is very different than one might expect [from] the overriding of the island by urbanization, and yet something that can be a very contributing urban part of overall Shanghai.

Here's one of the eight cities being proposed. Eight hundred thousand people will live here when it's ultimately built out.

I wanted to turn for just a moment to two other locations, first Singapore and then Hong Kong, because I think these are other representations of extraordinary things that are happening through the use of infrastructure and through the use of transportation.

Early in its transformation from colony to city state, Singapore realized that land was its most scarce resource, truly being an island. So early on its first investments as it came out of colonial state were in housing, in education, and in transportation. And the result has been—and we were fortunate to participate with them in the

development of the first segment of the lines—clear, convenient, democratic transportation available to all. But before these stations were designed with their clear platforms, and before the transportation alignments were put in place, we were commissioned to work with the transportation authority to do station-area plans for each potential station location and to participate in the selection of the locations where the stations ultimately would be.

I have to say it's quite remarkable to look at such a clean image of transportation, and our experience of working here was greatly heightened by going to visit the car workshop area. Visiting the shop is truly a revelation. When you arrive you are shown how the Singapore transportation authority can receive a subway car, completely disassemble it, take all the component parts out, rework them all, and within nine days reassemble that car and return it to work. And meanwhile you can eat your lunch everywhere in the shop, with the possible exception of the oil pits, where the oil is drained out of the component parts that are rebuilt and restored. A very different attitude about commitment to maintaining the essential aspect of transportation infrastructure.

So having had the opportunity to participate, we were enormously delighted to be invited back several years later to bring the train to the plane, to bring the subway to Changi Airport, which is shown in the plan here. This is Terminal One, the airport as garden, existing Terminal Two, a future Terminal Three, and in our thankfully winning competition the two atria that connect the subway station in the middle of the airport in this location. From start to finish, from start of competition to opening day this was three years, not three decades, to bring the train to the plane. And in a really wonderful piece of architecture that rather than taking you underground in a hurry welcomes you through two 40-meter-tall atria spaces, through the garden, down to the various levels of the subway platform, where a 40-meter-wide platform and a glass-enclosed pedestrian bridge connecting the tunnel tell you that you're important even as you are riding the subway.

Back up at the airport, though, through this connection of working there we had the opportunity to work with the airport authority and the government of Singapore on what a transportation terminal, what an airport terminal, should be for the future, remembering of course that these are investments in economic development and yet at the same time statements about the extraordinary future that Singapore holds for itself. And of course the major feature of an airport is its many-acred roofs. This is approximately 220 meters by about 240 meters, and here we are 3 degrees from the equator. So we said our client you know, one of the worst things about traveling on airplanes is you don't know what time it is, you don't know what time of day it is, you don't know where you are, and you're in completely a world of unnatural environment, unnatural light. You're 4 degrees from the equator, we think that you're up to the challenge of lighting all the major public spaces of the building with natural light every day of the year from seven o'clock in the morning until seven o'clock at night. So we worked with them to come up with an idea of an active, louvered roof. There are 1,100 skylights, they are computer-actuated louvers that close on a very sunny day to let the light filter through and open on a cloudier day, producing an environment in which the person feels the activity, the vitality, the sense of natural light, and doesn't realize that it's a highly technological machine that's just making him feel better about his experience of arriving in Singapore.

Now as I said, all of this is about economic development, let us not kid ourselves, and this is what it is aimed at. Singapore's existing central business district is completely built out, and so they have created another landfill with 98 acres at its core that is intended to support over the next decades 60 million—60 million—square feet of future development. It's not so improbable when you recognize that 68 million square feet of office space is what's also projected as a need for New York City, but Singapore, an island nation, is certainly gambling on a very big future, and is using its wise investment in transportation to support that.

One more project. I just want to talk briefly about Hong Kong and its urban setting. As you all know, just before the British returned Hong Kong to the nation of China, the decision was made and implemented to move the airport from the very center dense quarters of downtown Hong Kong and Kowloon out to Lantau Island, where it proudly sits at the head of the Pearl River Delta, strongly connected to Zhongshan, Guangzhou, and Macau. This is Hong Kong at a moment, I'm interpreting here, proposing to reinterpret itself. As the strong cities of China emerge, as Shanghai rises into its moment of power and presence, complemented by the other hundreds of plus-million-person cities, Hong Kong needs to redefine itself. So the strategy here in order to effect the outcome is to embrace change, to embrace movement, and see what can be done.

This is an aerial of the airport. The Foster Terminal, the extraordinary capacity for the movement of people and goods, but there's a leftover space where the original island was of about 100 acres that is not needed directly for airport purposes. So we were asked to work with the Hong Kong airport to develop SkyCity—never very original names, we hope they get to a better one than that—which is an extended terminal complex but a city center with exhibition facilities, working offices, recreational facilities, hotels, and waterfront activities that really make the airport itself as a port a place to be, still supportive of but not necessarily any longer dependent on the city to its east.

This is that plan, in very early stages, a trade zone, an exposition zone, entertainment zones, but all tied together by walking systems below grade transit, and keyed around the activity of the airport, not just the people traveling through, but the people already working at the airport around the clock.

A key building to this is the first building and it's called SkyPlaza. It is itself a 2-million-square-foot building that mixes both transportation facilities, airport check-in, taking care of all of the things related to your travel, transferring to coaches, transferring to ferries, but at the same time a place of activity and entertainment, a place where people will actually spend time. So if you don't know whether you're looking at shopping center or airport, that's probably because that's the intention here, that it is becoming more a part of your everyday life, as you've seen in this example as well. This is now entering construction.

I'll just spend a moment wrapping up on the things I've tried to address here. The six essential characteristics: extraordinary pace is a given, extreme density is a friend, object architecture is hopefully for the better and not for the worse, infrastructure under stress is an opportunity to shape city form, environmental challenge generates new forms of community, new forms of urbanism, and global

position and wealth formation reinforces the need for cities that embody diversity, tolerance, and opportunity for all.

I'm not going to review all of these. I hope you saw them embodied in the projects. But I've added two, because it's clear that in the framing of the issues of doubt and uncertainty and yet still possibility for new forms, that it is critical to take not only the longer but also the larger view, and to eliminate all single-minded forms of thinking, single use, single district, and to emphasize the fact that globally, regionally, locally, and building by building, urbanism to have its value must be something where things and people all work together.

In closing, there is an eighth strategy, an experiential one, which is: in the end the goal is not sameness, the goal is to remember the difference and the genius of each of the places that we have the privilege to work, live, and visit.

Thank you very much.

Hilary Ballon: Our last speaker this morning is Mark Wigley, the new dean of the Columbia Graduate School of Architecture, Preservation, and Planning. Since coming to this country in 1987 from his native New Zealand—I thought you might all wonder where he was from—he's been shaking things up in the world of architectural theory and criticism. A scholar of modern architecture and exhibition curator, he's also a very prolific critic with a sparkling intellect and a gift, if I may say, for overturning conventional ideas with an arresting image that quite simply changes the way you see things. We're lucky to have a person of his wide-ranging interests and his intellectual flair at the helm of the School of Architecture, and as our last speaker this morning. Dean Wigley.

Mark Wigley: Thanks, Hilary, and thank you very much to Hilary, and Ira, and Alan for not only putting the conference together, but putting it symbolically at the end of the 250 years of celebration of university. I think it's almost impossible for me to follow my esteemed colleagues, and so what I have to do is divert attention for a while from the brilliance of their work. And in a way that seems to be by design. I mean, conferences have an architecture as well, and in this case it's an interesting architecture. All the architects are in the morning, and some people think the best things are in the morning. And in the afternoon you go to sleep, so normally architecture, the design of architecture, actually happens in the afternoon.

If we look at the global schools of architecture, they have only two things in common. One is that in every school, in every country, you're required to do some mathematics and physics before you train as an architect. It's also the case that no amount of mathematics or physics is ever used inside a school of architecture. So the reason we suggest that you need to have mathematics and physics in a school of architecture is to, as it were, give the sense that the architect is a practical person, in control of the physical fabric. And as you know, in fact architects are not allowed to do the mathematics and physics for buildings. And since most of my friends are architects, I can tell you that's a very good idea. But we like to give the impression that we are practical, thoughtful people. The second thing that's common in schools of architecture throughout the world is that history and theory is taught in the

morning and design is taught in the afternoon, and it's an absolute kind of rigid sense. That is to say, you think in the morning and you draw in the afternoon. So lunchtime becomes crucial; lunchtime is the sort of moment in which all the history-theory classes of the morning get digested and somehow the student then applies the work in design. So to put three of our very best designers in the morning is to treat them as thinkers, as people who have ideas. And of course that's exactly what they've demonstrated, which creates an interesting position for the lawyers, historians, anthropologists, sociologists, economists, and political scientists in the afternoon because they're occupying the space of design. And I think that's exactly the issue I want to talk about: what might be the relationship between design and thinking, reflection, and the city?

The twenty-first century, right? A very particular kind of city, that is to say, the city of today and tomorrow. And I suppose if we'd added to our list of statistics about the evolution of cities, if we added another statistic on the evolution of conferences about the city, how many times does the city get talked about in conferences in universities? It would be an absolutely staggering amount. And of course all of us know instinctively that there is no amount of conferences that could come to terms with even part of the city, but we do desperately try, and it seems that we should do so here in a university. But that very concept of "the city" seems to already, as it were, foreclose the very thing that makes these conferences important, interesting, and even pleasurable, which is actually, frankly, we have no idea what "the city" is. And so it's not "the city." If it was "the city" we would've figured it out centuries ago. In fact, it's not the case that a city is like a patient, something that has a kind of a clear form and a series of pathologies and we can meet like doctors and discuss. And often the medical analogy is used—what would be the appropriate regimes, what would be the appropriate medicines, which part of the city should be, as it were, chopped off, which part needs plastic surgery, which part needs rebuilding, and so on. The city is not like a patient that walks in the door and says that I'm not well. And in fact one of the things you could say that is unique about the situation that we find ourselves in today is that it's precisely today that it's no longer clear what a city is; that is to say, we meet precisely, in Steven's words, in doubt, we are working in doubt, doubt about what the patient is, in fact. And I think that's why a conference about the city in a university is especially important, because this is a place for thinking, right? A university is not a place for ordinary people, it's not a place for people that know how to get things done. Actually it's kind of a place for losers, people who are disconnected, people that have vacations lasting all the way from July through to September, right? People that cannot be fired, right? A university is not part of the city, it's in the city but somehow detached from it. When you pass across that threshold very near this building, interestingly enough, when you entered this room today you entered from the street, which might mean this conference is literally poised, let's say, between the century of the university and the city itself. And it's precisely that detachment from the city which allows the university to then reflect—allows these people whose lives, whose sense of fashion (but not their sense of food, as Steven pointed out) has been somehow lost in order that we can reflect. And we invite our students to leave the city behind, to reflect upon the city, and then return to the city with new forms of expertise, new forms of passion, new forms of commitment and energy. So it is precisely in the university that we embrace the idea fully that we have really not a deep sense of what the city is, and we work together collaboratively to try and figure out what it might be and what kind of actions might

be possible within it. We are watching the city all the time, we are losers but in another sense we have the potential to create winners.

And I think this is what makes, let's say, the possibility for a different kind of discourse today. There have been so many conferences, particularly since the 1950s—the late fifties—about the fact that cities are spinning out of control, that there is this unsustainable growth, that there is these vast kind of explosive contaminations of urban sprawl, these super super-cities, all of this idea that the city has become, as it were, out of control. But these theories really don't have any bite, don't have any potential for us, and they don't help us to learn what kind of actions are necessary if we haven't figured out what a city is. That is to say, everybody gets up and says, "The city is out of control," but what "the city" is has remained, let's say, unclear.

What does this mean for us, let's say, just at the level of daily experience? It's possible to argue, let's say, in this conference, which might not have been possible in the late fifties, that this is a moment in time in which people actually experience in their daily lives what used to be a kind of theoretical position, a university position, that the local and the global have become inseparable. This is now, let's say, not a theory, it's how one lives. This of course was very, very clearly predicted in those conferences of the late fifties, but before that most importantly it was imagined by science-fiction writers, particularly in the nineteenth century. And in fact a lot of our best thinking about the city has come again from another group of people, who detached themselves from everyday life in order to generate new kinds of fantasies about what the future might hold. And all of us to a certain extent are now living inside the fantasies of a previous generation, but we should remember a generation more or less of the nineteenth century. So to a certain extent the twentieth century has in fact been constructed in the nineteenth century.

Now the vast changes that have occurred through the evolving systems of communication and circulation, electronic, physical, and so on, have certainly taken us to the point, a point that was theorized and now is experienced, where our cities are so intricately networked into a global system that the perceptible limits of the city have simply disappeared, don't exist. The paradoxical symptom of this disappearance is that the name of each city has become bigger and bigger. Each city now has to promote itself like any other product, precisely because the city is not there, it's not in front of you, doesn't have a clear identity. There have to be advertising experts who produce a sense of that identity, and in fact architects are often called in as part of that publicity part of that campaign. And more than that, if that campaign was to stop for a moment, if all of these extreme images, all these extreme definitions and so on would disappear, the city itself would go away. And I remind you of the fact that this is not just, let's say, a whole new phenomenon. It's always been for us the case that you know when you have arrived in a city because there is a sign that says "Welcome to the city," and that sign always appears in a kind of gray zone somewhere between the inside and the outside, and that's why the sign is there. The city itself doesn't say, "I'm here." And remember, the city is supposedly filled with millions of people and enormous quantities of glass, steel, plastic, and so on. So what you have is a huge social and physical infrastructure which is actually more or less invisible. It becomes visible as a city only through the actions of the sign that says "Welcome" and another sign, by the way, which says "You are now leaving."

Now if you do a history of such signs, if you go back and say when was it that cities required signs, in fact you will find yourself back at the very beginning of the city; that is to say, this is not a recent phenomenon. A city is in fact a kind of observation on a social system, on a physical infrastructure. And I return to that point later. But for us what does it mean? It means that we actually don't go to cities anymore; cities come towards us. And when we, as it were, visit a city, we are in a certain extent visiting the hard copy of the images that have been streaming towards us of that particular city, and more than that our whole experience of a city of course has to do with those images, those thoughts, that we had before we went there. So to a certain extent what goes on is a dialogue between what we imagined we were going to find and what we find. And since what we find is controlled or organized or displaced by what we thought we would find, we can never really say that we were there; rather, we were in the vicinity of the idea of a city. And this of course is a pleasure, this is the great pleasure of visiting a place and thinking, thinking about what that place might be.

A second point we might make—and again this is a contemporary experience of all of us living in the city—is that the difference between the city and nature has become again completely dissolved. And right now, for example, a lot of our scientific research has taken that concept even further. It's not just that cities are, as it were, sprawling to such an extent that there is no visible line between urban and suburban—not even exurban seems like a valid category right now—but our very best scientists are demonstrating that the huge built-up conglomerations of the contemporary city are in fact enormously agile, lively ecosystems in a traditional sense. That is to say, there are an enormous amount of species that are living very well precisely because of these huge physical infrastructures that we have installed that for so many years we imagined to be, as it were, the enemy of nature, and so on. It turns out that the built environment is considerably more natural in that sense than we thought. Again, this was very much a theoretical position, it was aligned to the idea, as Hilary pointed out earlier, the thought, that the city itself was a biological species, and therefore to live in a city is one species to, as it were, live within another. And as we live and die, so too do the buildings around us live and die. But somehow now this is a little bit more in the nature of experience. And I think this shift from a kind of theoretical position, then a scientific position, then even, let's say, a political decision, to the experience in one's own body, in one's own life, in one's own social transactions, is a kind of a crucial shift that has to be dealt with, let's say, back here in the university.

All of this means that the whole category of the city is radically in doubt right now. But if what I've said to you so far is true, it sort of seems odd because how could I be speaking to you so passionately about this thing that I claim doesn't exist, the city? And the reason that we can have a conversation about something that never exists is [that] I believe all of us have a certain image of the city in our mind, which is basically a middle-sized medieval town, that is to say, a central public space—what we would call today a public space—lined with religious, marketplace, and political forces, leading to a kind of quasi semi-industrial sector which makes its way towards a fortified wall beyond which lies the outside, the rural. And this little image, this sort of perfectly naïve image, of an elegant little town is an image of the domestication of the wild, that is to say, beyond the limits of the city walls lies the uncontrollable

forces—literally the forces of violence, of the weather, and so on—and inside is provided sanctuary, social life, stability, and so on.

Whenever we talk about something like the twentieth century city and what's happened to it, it's my view that that old image, that kind of chocolate-box image, is in everybody's minds. And why is it a chocolate-box image? Because there is no crime in the image, no disease, no waste, no violence, no inequality, no social immobility, no smell. Do you know what a city of that time smelled like? Even London—until very, very recently, members of Parliament would faint due to the fumes at the front. You know, in London when the horses die, the horses lie in the streets and rot, and there's a kind of a union which was dedicated to removing the horses, but the union would not, depending on how things were going, be cleaning up all the horses all the time. The city of our dreams—the medieval city that has been so radically lost and leads people to say that cities today have no place, that we have no real feelings, that everything is a disaster—we wouldn't survive for a microsecond in those cities. It's not just that there's not a Starbucks, although that's a major feature—and, by the way, when these such cities are restored and there's a kind of restoration movement devoted to protecting this image, so that we can then, as it were, modify our experience of other cities, all those things are removed. One could argue that if you want to faithfully restore a medieval town in the middle of so-called Old Europe that you should, as it were, restore the dead animals, restore the particular violence, restore the political system, restore the hierarchies, and so on, and so on. We don't do that of course, so what we do is very conveniently hold in our mind a kind of a dream. And it's very important when that dream is still alive when discussing something like, for example, a major urban conglomeration in China, because what would it be to, as it were, import that dream to such a situation and in the reverse?

Anyway, this radical displacement of our traditional concept of the city calls for new forms of analysis, right? If we can really not be so easily talking about "the city," we will require slightly different approaches. There will no longer be simple concepts like planning and design, it will no longer be so easy to say that the designers in the morning and some other kind of person is in the afternoon. The status of the architect will surely shift. But most importantly, it's my view that the status of the other disciplines will shift, that is to say, the sciences and the humanities will also be reconfigured and quite possibly will be the ones that will undergo the most radical transformation.

It seems to me obvious that a university could help the world, and it seems to me that would be [a] decent enough mission for a university; we could help the world figure out what a city is or is not, and therefore help to foster new senses of responsibility, new forms of action outside, but also new forms of knowledge-generation and reflection and research within the university. And it's my view that like all questions of responsibility this best starts at home. That is to say, the best way for us, certainly for Columbia, to engage in, let's say, a debate about the global city would be to simply try to understand our own city thoroughly, so thoroughly that we would then be able to engage in fruitful dialogue with other cities. That is to say, it's somewhat too easy for us to go to another city that seems bigger, stranger, faster, and so on, an interesting moment because one of the kinds of implications of Marilyn's statistics is that New York is becoming relatively rural, one of the implications of it dropping down to the situation of being the 11th city, and hopefully,

let's say, in a few years the twentieth city, and so on—we would become, as it were, a model for a new kind of low-density rural stability. And it's in that spirit I think that we could precisely examine Manhattan as an island, as a model of biodiversity, as a model of the very things that we find upsetting elsewhere.

And of course if what I was saying to you before is the case, that the local and the global have become inseparable, to study deeply New York City would be in fact to study the global city directly. The deeper one would go into the unique character of New York City, the more one would find out that it's intimately connected at its heart to other cities that seem so far away and foreign. Indeed, the deeper one goes into Manhattan the more one finds oneself right in the middle of other cities, and I don't mean sort of philosophically, socially, and so on; one is actually there to a certain extent. And of course this is perhaps what makes New York in its classic form slightly different from other cities: It is certainly a city that has for a very long time belonged to the global city and acted as a kind of transit point for reflection and so on. Again I would suggest that means that New York itself is our most valuable resource if we want to, as it were, with both expertise—but also most importantly—with modesty, and a certain caution in our thinking, we should start our thinking at home.

So let's say some very, very quick points then, since my role is to somehow stand as an academic architect between a series of practicing architects and a series of expert philosophers, historians, and so on. What would be a few quick points to put there in the middle? I could of course act here as a kind of insulation to make sure the world of design stays away from the world of philosophical, and social, political reflection. That would make sense. Lunch would then perform the kind of classical role of kind of mixing everything up and then suitably digesting all the various projects we have seen that were so elegant, so precise, and so clear, the clarity of the architect versus, let's say, the uncertainty, caution, prudence of the academic might get blurred up a little bit.

If I make to you a couple of points, very quickly. Number one, architects don't design cities, and they don't even design for cities. Rather, they develop kind of reflections on what a city might be. If you want to know what an architect is, an architect is somebody that doesn't answer questions but somebody who asks questions, almost always the case. The architect is called in when there is a situation in which people do not understand. There are complex and heterogeneous forces that don't seem to be off to work. The architect is the person who provides, let's say, an image or an organization that makes incompatible things work together. The architect is extremely gifted at seeing, at visualizing the possible connection between things that don't seem to belong together. But it is the weak architect, the uninteresting architect, that does so in such a way that the uncertainty of that situation disappears. In fact, it is the great gift of the architect to provide this kind of clarifying organization while at the same time allowing, even accentuating, the experience of that dissonance, of that complexity, in that situation.

My point would be that the architect, while being, of course, for all intents and purposes supposedly a practical person—somebody that knows a lot of mathematics and physics, and has friends that will help them out to make sure the buildings don't fall over—is in fact a public intellectual, somebody who builds in the material world, who acts decisively in the social environment, but does so to raise questions, to think, rather than to answer questions, to close down thinking.

You know, you can be uncertain and right. Now the university is of course exactly the place in which uncertainty and doubt are balanced with assertion, with claim, with hypothesis, exactly a place in which one tries to sit constantly on the line between certain and uncertain, to hold one's students between confidence, expertise, and doubt that will allow them to modify and change their confidence and expertise.

Okay, expertise about what then? If the architect is more of a philosopher than a practical person, more of an artist, more of a thinker, more of somebody that helps other people to think and to reflect— reflect about what?

So point number two, the city is not a physical thing. Despite the very strong association that we always make between large groups of people and large conglomerations of physical material, cities are not physical. It's certainly the case that cities are, indeed, all about density, that the word *city* invokes certain density, but it's many different kinds of things coming together, and it's not a visible density of certain kinds of buildings or certain kinds of people, it's a density of transactions between dissimilar people, dissimilar objects, and dissimilar ideas. The heart of the city is therefore, as Hilary so eloquently pointed out at the beginning, heterogeneity, diversity, but more important, ongoing diversity. Even, one could say that a city is a machine to not only accommodate, but to increase diversity.

For this reason, point number three: In my view, the biggest single threat to the city is fundamentalism in any form: religious, economic, nationalistic, ideological, even if not especially artistic. That is to say, intolerance of difference is the only enemy of the city, that thing which we can never exactly say what it is. And it is so typical, let's say, of the way one thinks in the university that one can be much clearer about what something is not than what it is. And in so doing one edits out the confusion in order to focus and to ask people to focus on the same point.

So, fourth point then. If this is the case, then human rights is an issue, if not the issue, of urban design. That is to say, if fundamentalism is the single greatest threat to the city and to the quality of the city, then human rights is in fact the major issue in urban design. To take one of the examples of the subjects that will dominate the afternoon, the law itself, for example, can be understood as an urban mechanism, I mean directly an urban mechanism. And by this I don't simply mean that actually historically the city is in fact a legal decision, it is nothing but that actually in the end. But more than that, the law itself, I would argue, is part of the fabric of the city, the very fabric in its ongoing definition and continual redefinition of limits, rather than something that is applied to the city or applied to the occupants of a city. The law, you could argue, is constantly negotiating over, therefore designing and redesigning the relationship, for example, between private and public. And the relationship between private and public is one of the standard ways you identify an architect, that is, one of the fields of expertise of the architect—lawyers and the people who work for them, lobby them, and so on; that is to say, all of us are in the business of renegotiating the relationship between private and public, and in that sense the law is operating as architecture.

The reverse is also the case. Physical design in the hands of an architect (or, as is most often the case, not in the hands of an architect) can be understood to have ethical, even juridical function, that is to say, legal function by virtue of its definition of space. The designs of an architect offer limits that allow people to live together,

negotiable limits, where living together means not just breathing but the multiplication of diversity, the production of mutation, the production even of conflict. The key issue, then, challenging the disciplines responsible for the physical environment today is responsibility itself; that is to say, how does one conceive of the relationship between design and responsibility? Which is why I would like to end my comments by suggesting to you that in fact the morning session of gifted architects was devoted, as you saw, to philosophical reflection, to doubt, to—as Steven put it—working with doubt, in doubt, creating, let's say, brilliant projects that allow you to see the city differently, which means in fact to sort of see it for the first time. And I think this is exactly what an architect tries to do, to bring something of this mysterious thing, the city, into visibility, not simply so that people can live in it, but can think, and reflect, and live differently in those places.

So I would like you to think of the morning as being in fact a morning of law, history, anthropology, sociology, economics, and political science. And I look forward to the afternoon which I believe will be an interesting group of architects, of designers, who will be not simply reflecting upon cities, [but] each of those fields, law, history, anthropology, and political science. I would just for a moment suggest to you that you think of them as fields of design, not as forms of reflection on cities, but on forms of design of the cities, and I invite you then to consider each and every one of the arguments that you will hear this afternoon as a series of elegant, precise, reflective designs to be, as it were, embraced and even exhibited here in the same way as one would normally exhibit the work of an architect, because in my view architects they are. And if these two groups are not working together, hopefully eating together at lunchtime, nothing good will happen here. I'm of the view that enormously good things will happen here, and I'm incredibly proud to be working in a university that will choose as the way it will end its 250th anniversary to focus on what is the question that hurts us and helps us the most, which is that of this mysterious thing, this impossible thing, this thing that you can never see, that I claim doesn't exist, which is our life, which is to say the city.

Thank you.

SESSION 2: TOLERATION

Ira Katznelson: Good afternoon. I'm Ira Katznelson. I'm a member of the political science and history departments here at Columbia, and with Hilary Ballon I've helped organize this event. I say "with Hilary Ballon," but in this case alphabetical order actually genuinely reflects the order of responsibility and effectiveness in shaping this so far very fascinating event.

And welcome to the session on toleration. If heterogeneity and diversity—as we heard this morning—are the most cherished values of cities and urbanism, then the complex concept of toleration must be its underpinning. Imagine an urban environment not characterized . . . alas, we don't have to work too hard to imagine urban environments not characterized by toleration.

Toleration, we should remind ourselves, has not been the norm in human history. Even when majorities and minorities of different kinds lived side by side in relative

peace, that is not toleration, which at minimum must signify some legitimacy to this heterogeneity, even if on unequal terms. And it requires not just ideas of toleration, but authoritative endorsement and enforcement. Toleration is a compound word, it refers to layers of meaning.

I'm not about to launch into a lecture. I'm about to introduce our principal speaker, but just think of the following five very quickly, one sentence each. Toleration raises questions of normativity. How desirable is it to tolerate the other? Toleration raises questions about group distance. How proximate are the tolerant and tolerated? How wide is our zone of human toleration? Toleration raises questions of social extensiveness. How many aspects, how many zones, how many spheres of life are covered by toleration? Toleration raises questions of doctrine. What doctrines support the practice of toleration, which religious or secular doctrines? And finally, what spatial range will toleration have? How far does toleration extend spatially? Sometimes limited historically to particular small locales, like Strasbourg in early modern Europe, and sometimes toleration might extend to the whole globe.

Now there's no one I'd like to hear more talk about toleration than Martha Nussbaum, a distinguished classicist, philosopher, student of literature, student of human development, student of gender, I could go on. She is one of our most interesting and illuminating intellectuals who is currently Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at my second-favorite university, the University of Chicago.

I'm not going to go into a long introduction. Almost everyone in this room is familiar with one or another or many aspects of her scholarship, her writing, her speaking. It's a great pleasure to introduce Martha Nussbaum.

Martha Nussbaum: Well thank you very much, and thank you for inviting me here on this very exciting occasion to come to my second-favorite city. So the first bit will be history of philosophy and philosophy, and then we'll get to the city at the end.

Toleration is an urgent preoccupation in modern liberal democracies. All such democracies are based on an idea of equal respect for citizens, but all contain a plurality of religious and secular comprehensive doctrines, to use John Rawls's phrase. That is, doctrines in terms of which people make sense of life to themselves and search for its moral basis and its ultimate meaning. Equal respect for citizens in such circumstances seems to require respect for their freedom and equality as they pursue matters of such fundamental importance. All such democracies, therefore, have strong reasons to support an idea of toleration understood as involving respect, not only grudging acceptance, and to extend toleration to all religious and secular doctrines, limiting only conduct that violates the rights of others. This norm is widely shared.

There's no modern democracy, however, in which toleration of this sort is a stable achievement. Toleration is always under siege from the forces of intolerance, and constant vigilance is required lest a powerful group impose its ways on an unwilling and relatively powerless minority. In the United States, Christian language and sentiments are often casually introduced in public-policy statements in ways that suggest the unequal dignity of non-Christians. And there are other danger signs that I'll mention later.

In India, the subject of much of my current writing, the forces of Hindu fundamentalism have produced terrible violence against the Muslim minority. Even the recent election does not make minority rights secure. And one could, of course, multiply such examples. How then can a respectful pluralistic society shore up the fragile human basis of toleration, especially in a world in which we need to cultivate toleration not only within each state but also among peoples and states in this interdependent world?

So now I'm going to turn to the history of Western philosophy to confront this question, and at the end I'll return to the contemporary scene and to the modern city.

I begin with John Locke's letter on toleration, a central text for the entire subsequent tradition. Locke's thought about toleration is complex and it's impossible to understand the argument of his letter fully without connecting it to the rest of his political thought, but let me, however, attempt a summary.

Locke insists that in matters of religious belief and religious conduct, as long as it doesn't violate the rights of others, the state must strive to protect "[a]bsolute liberty, just and true liberty, equal and impartial liberty." Not only must the state refuse the use of coercion to compel religious homogeneity, it must strenuously protect all its citizens from coercion on the part of others. Moreover no person is to be "prejudiced in his civil enjoyments," as Locke puts it, because of religion. Magistrates must go beyond non-persecution to zealous protection of all citizens in their rights so that "the goods and health of subjects be not injured by the fraud or violence of others." For both citizens and state actors the norm of toleration requires not only grudging preservation of rights but a spirit of what Locke calls "charity, bounty, and liberality." Church officials ought to advise their members of "the duties of peace and goodwill towards all men, as well towards the erroneous as the orthodox." They should industriously exhort their members, and especially civic magistrates to "charity, meekness, and toleration."

Locke advances several different arguments for this norm. Some rely on Christian doctrines, some assume a skeptical attitude toward religious beliefs. What concerns me here, however, is a strand in the argument that's both central to the work and more pertinent to our modern debates than any other. Modern readers of Locke may justly feel that some of his arguments are too internal, requiring a framework of Protestant ideas for their success. But this criticism can't be made against the line of argument that concerns me, and this is that all citizens have rights, that is, rightful claims over liberty, property, and other prerequisites of well-being. Moreover, these rights are equal. It is wrong for these rights to be undermined on grounds of religious difference.

Locke emphasizes the centrality of this part of the argument by stating, "The sum of all we drive at is that every man . . . enjoy the same rights that are granted to others." This argument is based on Locke's general political theory, and in particular on his idea of the social contract and its relation to rights. The key idea, I believe, is that of respect for persons. To say that persons have rights and should not be interfered with is a way of saying that persons deserve respect from one another. With regard to the fundamentals of well-being they are all equally entitled, and these

entitlements must be interfered with either by the state or through state inaction by one another.

Locke recognizes that people are not always generous and peaceable. Indeed his insistence on the duty of churches to exhort their members to toleration, generosity, and peace acknowledges the presence of a problem. People are inclined to go against the Lockean ideal. Locke's political surroundings did much to illustrate such violations.

But nothing is said about how a Lockean state can grapple with this problem beyond asking people to be nice to one another. Perhaps Locke believes that the problem is only temporary, the artifact of recent religious strife and bad clerical behavior. He simply lacks interest in the psychological underpinnings of intolerance. Locke thus leaves his own project in a position that is at best uncertain, at worst highly precarious and unstable. Without trying to figure out why intolerance is so ubiquitous, however speculative all such accounts are bound to be, it's difficult to say anything useful about the likelihood that toleration can remain stable. So let me now turn to Kant and to his famous doctrine of radical evil which does, I think, offer a profound diagnosis of bad behavior.

Kant is deeply influenced by the social-contract doctrines of both Locke and Rousseau. His state is basically Lockean in structure, uses a Lockean understanding of rights, and understands the limits of state action in roughly Locke's way. Kant does, however, feel the need to fill a gap in Locke's account by supplying in his book on religion a moral psychology of evil that explains why intolerance and other forms of bad behavior are likely to remain a permanent problem in human societies.

Evil is radical, according to Kant. That is, it goes to the very root of our humanity, because human beings have—prior to any experience—a propensity to both good and evil in the form of tendencies that are deeply rooted in human nature. Thus we are such that we could follow the moral law, but there's also something in us that makes it virtually inevitable that in some circumstances we will disregard the moral law and act badly. What are those circumstances?

Our animal nature is not itself the problem. Animal need, says Kant, is limited and easily satisfied. The tempter, the invisible enemy inside, is something peculiarly human, namely a propensity to competitive self-love, which manifests itself whenever human beings are in a group. He writes, "Envy, addiction to power, avarice, and the malignant inclinations associated with these assail his nature, which on its own is undemanding, *as soon as he is among human beings.*" And Kant italicizes that phrase. "Nor is it necessary to assume that these are sunk into evil and are examples that lead him astray; it suffices that they are there, that they surround him, and that they are human beings, and they will mutually corrupt each other's moral disposition and make one another evil."

Kant's account is powerful, although he's surely too sanguine about the opportunity of many of the world's people to satisfy bodily need. He's also surely right in holding the bodily need as not the biggest cause of bad behavior. Even when people are well fed and housed, and even when they have the other prerequisites of well-being they still behave badly to one another and violate one another's rights. And even though an innate propensity is a difficult thing to demonstrate, Kant seems right when he

suggests that people require no special social teaching in order to behave badly, and indeed regularly do so despite the best social teaching.

Kant is offering a general explanation for the origins of bad behavior, not a particular explanation of intolerance, but it has an obvious relevance to Locke's problem. Wherever people are together they form themselves into religious groups and vie for superiority among themselves. This process—difficult to explain with reference to the internal ideologies of the religions, which may be strongly in favor of peace and compassion, as Locke stresses for the case of Christianity—is well explained by Kant's idea of a propensity to competition activated by the mere presence of a group.

Now Kant's account, while attractive in many respects, is I think clearly incomplete. It's all very well to say that there are tendencies in human beings such that the presence of others will elicit competition and aggressive behavior, but Kant says much too little about the nature of those tendencies. Perhaps he thinks there's nothing more to be said. Radical evil is just the disposition to manifest competitive and morality-defying behavior in the presence of others. It seems to me that we can say more. In two books on the emotions, I've argued that understanding the roots of much bad behavior requires thinking about human beings' problematic relationship to their own mortality and finitude, their desire to transcend conditions that are painful for any intelligent being to accept. The earliest experiences of a human infant contain a jolting alternation between blissful completeness in which the whole world seems to revolve around its needs and an agonizing awareness of helplessness when good things do not arrive at the desired moment, and the infant can do nothing to ensure their arrival. The expectation of being attended to constantly, the so-called infantile omnipotence so well captured in Freud's phrase "His majesty the baby," is joined to the anxiety and shortly the shame of knowing that one is not in fact omnipotent, but utterly powerless. Out of this anxiety and shame emerges an urgent desire for completeness and fullness that never completely departs however much the child learns that it is but one part of a world of finite, needy beings. And this desire to transcend the shame of incompleteness leads to much instability and moral danger.

In writing about the role of shame and disgust in the process of group formation and social intolerance, I have argued that the type of social bad behavior with which I'm most concerned here can be traced to a child's early pain at the fact that it is imperfect, unable to achieve the blissful completeness that in certain moments it's encouraged to expect. This pain leads to shame and revulsion at the signs of one's own imperfection. And then, what most concerns me, here shame and revulsion in turn are all too often projected outward onto subordinate groups, who conveniently symbolize the problematic aspects of bodily humanity, those from which people would like to distance themselves. Thus my account of prejudice and hatred, whether religious or ethnic or sex-based, is more complicated than Kant's, invoking not mere plurality but also the hatred of weakness, helplessness, and ultimately death that's omnipresent in our relationship to our humanity.

And I argue that a primary reason why people form groups of the sort that engage in bad behavior toward others is a futile attempt to recover completeness and safety. By defining their own group as the good, normal one, lacking in nothing, and by surrounding themselves on all sides with such people, people gain the illusion of

safety and control, projecting onto subordinate others the weaknesses that they wish not to accept in themselves. By stigmatizing and persecuting others, they conceal from themselves their own vulnerability. Thus, unlike Kant, I think that radical evil is not a bare disposition to behave badly; it has an underlying content and a narrative history. Radical evil concerns the hatred of finitude. It's about narcissism, we might say, and the fear of death that's such a powerful prop in human narcissism. Thus the remedy for radical evil will have to address the problem of narcissism, not curing it, for life is too painful for human beings ever to accept it as it is, but mitigating its role in human life.

This narrative history of radical evil has implications for the social treatment of evil that Kant's far more abstract account does not, but for now let me return to Kant's genetic account which is compatible with mine although it doesn't entail it. I'm going to return to my own account in my concluding section by way of Walt Whitman.

Whenever human beings are together, then bad behavior is a likely outcome, and intolerance is one prominent form that it often takes, as one form of competitive self-love. Intolerance then is not easy to eradicate. People will seek to violate the rights of others, and in particular to establish the superiority of their own religious doctrines. To individual human beings Kant gives extensive advice. To counteract the bad tendencies in their nature they have the duty to surround themselves with a group of people who are all working for the victory of the good tendencies over the bad. People are unlikely to achieve a stable victory on their own, but in a group of like-minded strivers they have a better chance, forming a counter-society that will strengthen the moral disposition and protect it from the temptations that worldly society offers. That's actually the role that Kant sees for religion: it's a social force that supplies us a support structure for morality. Given that we're all morally weak and liable to error, we have an ethical duty to join such a society. Much of the text is then devoted to distinguishing good churches from bad churches, asking what type of religious community could actually do the job that Kant has laid out. Most existing churches, Kant argues, are actually a bad moral influence, since they teach people to placate God in extraneous ways and encourage competitive and subordinating behavior. But any of the major faiths could be suitably reformed and made to do the work.

What, however, of the liberal state? Given the ubiquity of the propensity to evil, what could such a state do to protect itself from the forces of bad behavior, generally, and intolerance in particular? Well, it can certainly use coercion to protect people's property rights and other rights that they have under the social contract. Here Locke and Kant are in agreement. But I've suggested that this leaves equal respect in a fragile position. So it would be nice to think that the state could find some further ways of supporting good behavior in general, toleration in particular.

Kant is just as averse as Locke to state-based religious coercion. He argues against it on both moral and prudential grounds. He says, "[W]oe to the legislator who would want to bring about through coercion a polity directed to ethical ends, for he would thereby not only achieve the very opposite of ethical ends, but also undermine his political ends and render them insecure." Even when people make a bad choice and join a bad church or no church Kant holds that respect for their autonomy requires absolutely respecting their liberty. Like Locke, he insists that no person's civil liberties may be infringed on grounds of religious membership or practice, but he

goes even further than Locke because he includes atheists as well under his protections.

So, there's a problem. Respect for autonomy requires us to tolerate the bad churches, which is what Kant thinks most actual churches are. Such churches actually strengthen evil and undermine toleration. So what can the state do to protect itself? Kant's answer, and the only answer he believes he can give consistently with his defense of autonomy, is that the state can and should foster a vigorous, critical culture, including strong protections for the freedom of speech and debate. Moreover, this state support should extend to generous funding for education and scholarship, especially higher education and critical scholarship on ethical matters.

All this is fine, as far as it goes, but the same principle that protects the scholarship Kant likes also protects the scholarship that he detests, and the same public openness that creates the conditions for rational religion to come into existence also gives wide scope for the mobilization of prejudice and hatred. This being the case, the state that Kant envisages remains in a fragile condition. He has to rely on the sophistication and rationality of a general public who are, as he himself says, very much inclined to the emotional and rhetorical appeals of the bad churches. In his suspiciousness about the passions and the sentiments he seems unwilling to propose any emotional dimension to public rhetoric in favor of rational religion and the good moral dispositions. To the extent that the good does prevail, Kant thinks, it must be because of good scholarship and enlightened argument. Kant advances beyond Locke in his profound understanding of human psychology, but his liberalism combined with his mistrust of the passions prevents him from doing very much about these threats.

The dilemma with which Kant's thought leaves us becomes more acute still when we consider the global society to which Kant's thoughts so powerfully pointed the way. As Kant stressed in his writings about international peace, one of the worst expressions of radical evil lies in the conduct of nations toward other nations. Wars of conquest, colonial domination, all of these are outgrowths of the competitive tendencies that Kant so well identified. And it's not surprising that intolerance of the different beliefs and ways of life of others is so often a part of those projects. But if the tolerant state is impotent to stop threats to its own stability internally, it has a harder time still once we articulate the goal in world terms, as that of respecting humanity wherever it is, and protecting the religious freedom and respect of all world citizens.

Now the tradition did provide one profound answer to my question which Kant knew and rejected. Rousseau, whose psychology is the source for Kant's, understood that the state that's going to protect toleration needs to think about the moral emotions. In the important section of *The Social Contract* called "Civil Religion," Rousseau argues that complete toleration in spiritual matters is of the greatest importance, but that it needs to be undergirded by the promulgation of what he calls a civil religion consisting of "sentiments of sociability, without which it is impossible to be a good citizen or a faithful subject." This religion, which is a kind of moralized deism fortified by patriotic sentiment, will hold the state together and create moral unanimity among citizens. Prominent among the dogmas of this religion is actually the badness of intolerance. Around these and other dogmas the sovereign will create ceremonies and rituals, engendering strong bonds of sentiment connected to morality and

patriotic duty. Outside this common core people can believe what they like, but all must adhere to the core with respect to both conduct and belief. So, thinks Rousseau, the state must repress not only conduct harmful to others, but also non-harmful conduct expressing a lack of adherence to the civil religion. And it should go further, repressing nonconforming belief and speech. In particular Rousseau claims, "It is impossible to live in peace with those whom one believes to be damned." And so he thinks that the state must repress any religious doctrine that teaches that a particular religion is the only road to salvation. In Rousseau's state, then Roman Catholicism and most existing forms of Protestantism would not be tolerated.

Rousseau has taken the problem of evil seriously and made a proposal that may be sufficient to cope with it. Obviously, however, his solution would be unacceptable to Locke, to Kant, and to anyone who finds the idea of a liberal Lockean state attractive. The cure is worse than the disease. He's purchased stability at much too high a price.

Another grave problem with Rousseau's civil religion is that it provides a very bad basis for international relations. The sentiments that cement the homogeneity of Rousseau's society make it highly suspicious and intolerant of foreigners, and prone to warlike behavior toward them. Rousseau likes this consequence. Indeed one reason why he feels the need for a civil religion to supplement Christianity is that he finds Christianity too passive, meek and mild. Anyone who finds Kant's idea of a peaceful and tolerant world order attractive will find here yet further reasons to reject Rousseau's proposal.

Rousseau's psychological insight, however, does not disappear once one rejects his solution. He seems right to insist that the state needs to take the problem of evil seriously and to devise some kind of public psychology to address it, a civil religion, if you will. And yet Kant seems right in his insistence that the problem of radical evil can not be addressed by state coercion, a free political and religious debate. So what's the solution? How can a respectful pluralistic society shore up the fragile bases of toleration, especially in a world in which we need to cultivate toleration, not only internally but also between peoples in an interlocking world?

Kant is surely right that one important part of the solution is the vigilant protection of the freedoms of speech, press, and scholarship. Intolerance thrives in a situation in which opinion is curtailed, and we can observe that intolerant groups usually, if now always, seek the curtailment of these freedoms as a road to domination. One further thing a liberal society may certainly do, and that most societies do already, is to attach rituals and ceremonies to the basic freedoms promoted by the society, inspiring citizens to love those values by linking the values to music, art, and ritual. This stratagem is dangerous given the propensity of all forms of patriotism to lead to the demonization of foreigners and local subversives; nonetheless, it seems to me that there are reasonable ways to institutionalize such ceremonies that don't buy into these dangers. Where toleration is concerned, a reasonable civil religion would include for example a celebration of the diversity of the traditions and comprehensive doctrines that are contained within a nation as a source of its strength and richness. In general there's a lot that a tolerant state may do through persuasion and rhetoric without abridging any freedoms of speech, assembly, and publication.

An attractive further proposal was actually made by John Stuart Mill in his essay called "The Utility of Religion." Here Mill, not liking religion himself but recognizing the importance of religious sentiments in giving force to moral motivation, suggests what he calls the *religion of humanity*, a moral ideal that can be promulgated through public education. According to this moral ideal a good person is one who cares deeply about humanity generally, her thoughts and feelings learn the habit of being carried away from her own parochial concerns, they're habitually fixed on what Mill calls this "unselfish object, loved and pursued as an end for its own sake." She learns to view helping others as a part of her own good. She identifies her good with that of humanity as a whole.

These ideas are closely linked to some that I've been trying to develop in other work concerning compassion as a moral sentiment that can be cultivated by public institutions and public education. I've argued that a liberal society without offending against respect for pluralism can still employ a moral ideal of this sort and promote a moral education aimed at underwriting it. This ideal would serve as a basis for public political culture in connection with norms of equality and equal respect. In effect, such a moral education would be the psychological underpinning to public norms that can command what Rawls called an *overlapping consensus* among people who otherwise disagree. And so, as I argue, it need not be seen as divisive or in any way illiberal when made part of public education.

But how more precisely would such a moral education be institutionalized? A good part of it, I think, would in fact take the form of developing institutions that express the views of equal respect and due attention to the needs of all, a just tax system, a just health-care system, a just welfare system. But institutions remain stable only when human beings have the will to sustain them, a fact that the collapse of the social safety net in the United States since the Reagan era has made an all-too-vivid reality. Therefore, I would argue, education at all levels should focus on putting forward something like Mill's religion of humanity, conveying the sense that all human lives are of equal worth and all are worthy of being lived with dignity and a decent minimum level of well-being.

More concretely, public education can cultivate awareness of the problems human beings face on the way to their well-being in different parts of one's own nation and in different parts of the world and can impart a sense of urgency concerning the importance of giving all world citizens decent life chances. Children can learn with increasing sophistication the economic and political obstacles human beings face on the way to their well-being, and can learn to see ways in which a just society might overcome these problems. At the same time education can try to minimize the role of greed and competitive accumulation in society by portraying greedy accumulation in a negative light and showing how it subverts the legitimate strivings of others, a teaching to which the major religions give lip service, even if they do not always insist in on it in practice.

Where toleration is concerned the religion of humanity takes in the first instance an institutional form here again in the form of strong protections for religious liberty and a support for the idea of equal respect for different comprehensive doctrines. Enhanced penalties for crimes involving ethnic, racial and religious hatred would also be very prominent parts of the institutional side of such a program, expressing society's very strong disapproval of intolerance and the actions to which it gives rise.

Although my proposal is Kantian in the sense that no civil penalties attach to people who speak in favor of greed, inequality, and even intolerance so long as they do no harm to others, it seems perfectly appropriate for public education and the media culture of a democratic society to focus on imparting norms that do support the values of a liberal society and a decent world culture. Thus where toleration is concerned, I would support education at all levels aimed at conveying understanding of, and respect for, different religious and secular doctrines and different ethnic and national traditions. Although knowledge does not guarantee good behavior, ignorance is a virtual guarantee of bad behavior. Stigmatization of the other is much easier when people know nothing or nothing complicated about a different religious or cultural tradition, whether local or foreign, as I think we see in the U.S. today with the case of Islam. But education can surely go further, fostering a sense of respect for people and their equal worth, their equal entitlement to lives with human dignity, of which religious freedom is one big part.

Because my understanding of radical evil is more complex than Kant's, I also argued in a recent book on shame and disgust that public culture needs to devote special emphasis to minimizing the negative effects of narcissism and of the aggression that's so closely connected to people's unwillingness to tolerate their own neediness, finitude, and embodiment. Many aspects of the inhibition of narcissism will once again be institutional. I insist, for example, that the disgust people feel at something is never a sufficient reason to render a practice illegal when it causes no harm to others, that shame is never a good device to use in criminal punishment. And I consider many ways in which the law can protect citizens from shaming and minimize the harmful effect of stigma. But much of the program must be once again informal and educational, devising ways to bring children up in a climate that fosters equal respect and minimizes the baneful social influence of disgust and stigmatization.

Once again, such teachings could be the object of what Rawls calls an overlapping consensus in a liberal society. They're given lip service by all the major religions, even though they're not carried out in reality. There's no reason why a more psychologically complex version of Mill's religion of humanity can not be widely taught and promulgated in public and private education, in the rhetoric of leaders and other political actors. These norms, I think, should be fostered together with support for a robust critical culture of the sort that Kant favors. In this way we reassure those who disagree with us, showing them that our proposal is not Rousseau's civil religion. And as Mill emphasized, we protect the ideas of the public culture from becoming near empty shells with no passion sustaining them, if we do debate them vigorously and constantly.

What examples might we draw as we ponder these questions? At this point a discussion might take many different directions. If I were giving this lecture in India I would now start to talk about Rabindranath Tagore, who used music and the arts to produce educational revolution, a big part of which was a poetry of freedom, mutual respect, and sheer love of difference as he expressed it, for example, in the song that he wrote that's now India's national anthem, which celebrates the nation's regional and ethnic differences as sources of strength.

Here in the United States, I could talk about Roosevelt's canny use of rhetoric during the New Deal, which led Americans to believe that the poor are not shiftless and lazy, but victims of economic catastrophe. I could also speak about the civil-rights movement, whose success was due in no small measure to Martin Luther King Jr.'s mastery of emotive rhetoric and to the movement's use of the blues, jazz, and gospel in connection with ideas of human freedom and equality.

But our topic today is the city, so let me speak instead in concluding about the rhetoric of the great American city. New York has been a particular source of a type of civic poetry and art that expresses a love of differences and celebrates the great energy that comes from difference when difference is respected and not feared. I think especially of Walt Whitman, who crafted a public poetry of inclusiveness for all America during and in the wake of the horror of the Civil War, modeled on his love of New York and his sense of what New York stood for. "Walt Whitman, a kosmos [*sic*], of Manhattan the son," he announces himself early in "Song of Myself," and immediately he juxtaposes to the idea of New York the key values of his ideal America.

Whoever degrades another degrades me,
And whatever is done or said returns at last to me
.....
By God! I will accept nothing which all cannot have their
counterpart of on the same terms.

What is the connection between these values and the idea of New York? Whitman shortly makes it explicit.

Through me many long dumb voices,
Voices of the interminable generations of prisoners and
slaves,
Voices of the diseas'd and despairing and of thieves and
dwarfs

.....
And of the rights of them the others are down upon,
Of the deform'd, trivial, flat, foolish, despised
.....
Through me forbidden voices,
Voices of sexes and lusts, voices veil'd and I remove the
veil . . .

New York functions as a metaphor for the turbulent diversity that is Whitman's America, and for the daring and energy of that diversity, all the forbidden people and things that dare to speak their names here. You can see that Whitman is addressing the roots of shame and disgust in a way that goes to the heart of my own understanding of intolerance. He says that if we learn to love and celebrate what is noisy, messy, and tumultuous, including prominently our bodies and our own messy sexuality, then we will be likely to hate and oppress others.

I'm reminded of the painter Red Grooms, who said this about his great painting, *Ruckus Manhattan*:

What I wanted to do was a novelistic portrait of Manhattan from Battery Park to Grant's Tomb. I also felt it had to include the dark sides of life as well as the lighter ones: prostitutes, thieves, and gamblers, tourists, shoppers, babies, moms, and dads. I wanted to get it all in, it got quite busy.

In both Whitman and Red Grooms this poetry of diversity is not free from difficulty. The dark side of life is dark. But there's a kind of love undergirding the whole enterprise, and the suggestion is that this love, which is at bottom a love of the messier parts of ourselves, can carry us forward. When we don't like our fellow citizens or approve of what they do we can still love them as parts of the great city that we celebrate and are. The poetry of inclusion carries us forward, helping us to investigate corners of life we usually view with suspicion, including, as Whitman knew so well, aspects of human sexuality that we usually cordon off as forbidden territory, telling ourselves that what makes us uncomfortable is outside and other. Thus Whitman's invitation to love the body provides a solvent for turbulent hatreds that grow out of our inability to tolerate ourselves.

There would be so much more to say about this topic, but I don't have time to pursue it. Let it suffice as a sign of what poetry, the public arts, and the noisy life of a great city can offer to America in a time of suspicion and intolerance.

Radical evil is not a piecemeal affair. What Kant and Mill rightly want is a whole new view of human relations, not just progress on this or that issue. And it's clear that radical evil is alive and flourishing in the United States now. Suspicion and mistrust of other peoples and groups seems to be growing. Rather than being encouraged to see the world as an international society in which we must all support the aspirations of people everywhere to decent and dignified lives, we're all too often encouraged to think in terms of U.S. preeminence and to see other nations as looming threats to U.S. power and safety, what I would call a narcissistic view of politics.

Domestically the dominant religion increasingly asserts its hegemony over minority religions and nonreligion, and public rhetoric often gives sanction to this aim. In the proposed gay-marriage amendment we see deep-rooted anxieties about sexuality, taking a hateful and repressive form. To counteract the influence of all this division we need not only good liberal doctrines and arguments, and not only, though it is crucial, the vigilant protection of free speech, we need a poetry of the love of free citizens and of their noisy, chaotic, sometimes shockingly diverse lives. Without this good liberal principles are just dead words on paper. As Whitman said:

To hold men together by paper and seal . . . is no account,
That only holds men together which aggregates all in a
living principle. . . .

And as he concluded in that poem, this means that American urgently needs poets, and we should add dancers and composers and musicians and painters and architects and sculptors.

But enough about New York. At this point, Chicago patriot that I am, I want to describe Chicago's new Millennium Park, which creates a public space that is its own poem of diversity. As you approach the park from Michigan Avenue you encounter first the Crown Fountain with those wonderfully comic faces of Chicagoans of all different ages and races and types slowly changing on huge screens. Every five minutes or so the two faces that are up on the screen at the time spit jets of water out of their mouths onto the waiting bodies of children who frolic in the shallow pool below, often joined at first shyly and gingerly by their parents and grandparents. My daughter, a cultural historian, calls this "an ejaculatory aesthetic." Well, yes, yes, that is its charm. As Whitman said of the young men bathing, so too of those huge faces, "They do not think whom they souse with their spray."

If you watch all this from a certain angle you will also see the plumes of the Frank Gehry band shell curling upward, a silver helmet that has suddenly decided to abandon military aggression and turn into a bird. From another angle you see the buildings of Michigan Avenue and the clouds above, but reflected as crazy curves in Anish Kapoor's sculpture *Cloud Gate*, a huge inverted stainless steel kidney bean. On Gehry's improbably curving bridge over the highway, people meander, pause, talk to strangers. The interactive public space celebrates diversity together with astonishing beauty, and both together with the pleasures of the body, as young and old paddle contentedly or stare at the reflected clouds.

Thinking about this example we might go one step further and say that America's great cities, New York, Chicago, and any others anyone might be able to think about, are not only the homes of poets and artists, they are themselves poems of the public acknowledgement and celebration of humanity, messy as it is. If there is hope that Whitman's vision of love and inclusion can prevail over the forces of hate arrayed against it, creating a civil religion of the best sort, there's no better place for that hope to take root than here.

Ira Katznelson: This elegant talk empowers me to report something I read in the *Dallas Morning News* on the Internet, that when Martha was 11, her friends referred to her as Artha Marguer because she loved a good argument. And thank you for that lovely and good argument.

Kathleen Sullivan just stepped down as dean of Stanford Law School. We know her as one of our most important constitutional scholars, coauthor of a major text in constitutional law. She's worked on First Amendment law; in the *New Federalist*, with Alan Brinkley and Nelson Polsby, has commented on our public politics and political conundrums; and she is, as many of us know who listen to NPR or watch public television, one of the most spirited and thoughtful commentators on public life. So it's a very great pleasure to invite her forward. Thank you.

Kathleen Sullivan: Thank you to Columbia. Thank you to Professor Katznelson and Professor Ballon for the privilege of being here. Thank you to Professor Nussbaum for the privilege of commenting on your paper. I just want to say it's a joy to be back in the city that I began my life in. I've been an expatriate in California for 11 years now, and it's—you didn't laugh at that, you need a visa—and it's especially wonderful to be back with Hilary Ballon. I had the pleasure of beginning graduate school with her in Cambridge, I dare say 25 years ago, and it's wonderful to see her preside over such a magnificent symposium.

Martha Nussbaum's deep and beautiful paper paints a picture of a latter-day and secular civil religion, or religion of humanity, in which the very multiplicity and messiness and heterogeneity of city life connects its residents in a commonality that is less than a comprehensive faith, but more than mere coexistence. And I want to focus in my brief remarks on this attempt to find an intermediate way between the kind of community we might imagine in a small and homogeneous town, the towns that were imagined by Rousseau when he spoke of the civic virtue of Geneva. Or the towns imagined by Madison when he wrote "Federalist Ten" and imagined many small, but relatively homogeneous localities being brought together in a national tapestry where multiplicity would take place at the broader level of government. She's trying to find for the city, I think, something between a vision of community that comes from homogeneity in locality, in the kind Rousseau and Madison imagined, on the one hand, and on the other hand, mere coexistence, mere side-by-side living without a common set of values or a common ethos. She imagines this middle way, this substantive and not value-neutral—but not comprehensive, either—kind of civil religion. She imagines it to be both reflected in and inculcated by civic art and ritual ceremony, an ethic of respect for the equal worth and dignity of all, despite our differences. And she imagines it to be reflected not only in these civic institutions, civic art, civic architecture—of the kind she described so beautifully a moment ago with Chicago's Millennium Park—but also, very importantly, through education. Who could be a better celebrant of Columbia's 250th anniversary than someone who finds so much in the educative, rather than the coercive, aspects of the liberal tradition from Locke through Mill? Especially the part where she suggests that the state ought have the affirmative task of underwriting the employment of scholars.

Now in commenting, let me begin by observing the elegant permutation to which Professor Nussbaum has subjected the topic. The topic is toleration, and yet notice how she drew us instead into a talk about respect for persons, using Locke's words "charity, bounty, and liberality" about an enlightened public culture, about public norms of equality and respect. And at the same time she dismissed notions of what she called mere grudging acceptance, or grudging *modus vivendi*. For her, toleration is a far cry from tolerance. For her, toleration is something more substantive, more of an active and value-laden commitment than mere indifference or restraint or abstention from judgment or interference. So she sets forth a vision that is positive—not negative, substantive, not procedural—and that emphasizes public, not private, life. She advocates a kind of convergence among heterogeneous groups. Not a complete one in which the overlap becomes a single focus, but one in which the overlapping consensus gives rise to a positive ethos in which we affirmatively value each other's differences rather than merely, shall I say, tolerate them or refrain from interfering with one another—a kind of *eccumenicism*, rather than indifference.

Now note that while Professor Nussbaum's public culture of toleration embraces some substantive commitment to valuing diversity, I don't mean to suggest for a moment that she advocates a true literal view of "the melting pot," that famous metaphor in which all cultural flavors and spices would resolve ultimately into a single, bland stew. In fact, she recoiled with horror from the thought that anyone would brand her view communitarian in that sense. She's not talking about a single communitarian nor, I might say, is she advocating a political version of unitarianism (avoidance of all conflict or mutual offense through an agreement to believe in one

God, at most). Now I can't offend you if you're unitarian, right? She advocates instead a mutual belief in a kind of metadoctrine. Not a doctrine of faith, but a metadoctrine, that it is good that all different sects—and here she takes the religious emphasis of the early liberal theorists and, I think, expands it to have us think about sects not just in terms of religious faiths but also in terms of ethnic cultures and gangs and societies of solidarity and civic groups of all variety. She advocates a mutual belief in this metadoctrine that all different sects in this broader sense exist side by side in all their diversity such that each prefers the other's continued existence—even if it is in muscular difference and debate—rather than the other's competitive extinction, the bad narcissistic aspect of radical evil she so beautifully described. So her vision is holist, if not communitarian, not individualist and libertarian.

Now let me contrast this. I'm a constitutional lawyer, and I want to set Professor Nussbaum's beautiful picture of this new civil religion against the backdrop of an alternative that we might associate more typically with American constitutionalism and protections of civil liberties. And this vision is dominantly negative and procedural, rather than positive and substantive, and it emphasizes the facilitation of the expression of heterogeneous values in more and it emphasizes or less the private sphere: our private churches and synagogues and mosques and clubs and parties and voluntary associations. It emphasizes the expression of these heterogeneous values principally in the private, rather than the public, sphere. And this view, too, is latent in the theorists whom Professor Nussbaum has described in her tour de force. If you emphasize more of Locke's social contract rather than his injunction to toleration, you see this more negative view, procedural view. If you emphasize Kant's categorical imperative rather than his doctrine of radical evil, you see it in Kant. If you focus on Mill's harm principle—the view that liberty consists of being free to do anything that is self-regarding, but that my right to extend my arm ends at the limits of your nose—the harm principle expresses this liberal view, rather than his philosophy of education, you see this negative alternative view of toleration latent in all the philosophers she's discussed.

Now in this alternative strand of modern liberal thought, the obligation of the state is to intervene, to prevent interpersonal exercise of force or fraud, and to refrain from interfering with individual liberty—to leave people free from state interference, rather than to enable them to be free to express a civic religion. Patriotism might be demanded by *raison d'état*, but not enculturated in us to ennoble us or bring us together. Speech on this alternative civil libertarian view might be limited if it is a spark to tinder of violence, if it will incite an angry mob, but not if it merely denigrates or causes self-pity or anger or resentment or alarm or hurt. Faith may not be coerced but neither should the government, in this view, be a bully pulpit. In this view toleration is a condition not so much of equal respect and concern for others but of the maintenance of proper boundaries that prevent us from interfering with one another's liberties as we define them in private life.

Now to make this abstract juxtaposition of Professor Nussbaum's positive view in this traditional American civil-libertarian view which I'm describing as more negative, let me just give you a simple example to contrast the views, a simple homegrown example.

Imagine that you have suddenly learned that a colleague you've known for a long time is gay. You're surprised; you didn't know that. Well I believe that on the positive view of toleration that Professor Nussbaum espouses, the right thing to say at that point is something like, "Ah, well some of my best friends are gay." Or, in West Coast parlance, simply, "Far out." The alternative negative view is to express an absolute lack of surprise or notation, a kind of indifference to that learned fact. The conversation would go differently, something like this. Dialogue proceeds: "So your partner, he . . ." The interlocutor says, "No, she," and the person simply resumes and says, "Your partner, she . . ." and proceeds without skipping a beat. The second view is one of indifference (Why should I bother about your private life? Why should it matter to me at all?), as opposed to an affirmative exclamation of support, or toleration in an affirmative sense. That's a highly stylized view of this difference I'm trying to describe.

Now let's map both of these visions: the positive, substantive civic religion on the one hand, the abstinent, restrained indifference to other people's differences, indifference to difference. Let's map those both onto urban life. As Professor Ballon said to eloquently this morning, "Urbanism confronts us with a very dense juxtaposition of diverse populations in close proximity that intensifies the potential for conflicts of cultures and values." Professor Nussbaum's model, as I understand it, favors even in urban life, as opposed to small-town life, a relatively thick public culture of mutual respect encouraged by civic institutions and even the architecture of public life, the sense of commonality across difference that is famously elicited, tumultuously and deeply, traumatically elicited in terrible crises. Think of New Yorkers and visitors to the city sleeping peacefully and unmolested on sidewalks during the great East Coast blackout. Or think, more poignantly, joining in grief and civic recommitment in the wake of 9/11. In Professor Nussbaum's view, the kind of commonality in which we rise above our differences in moments like those becomes an aspiration even for more daily and quotidian existence, and the institutions of government, including public education, are to encourage and facilitate this mind-set.

By contrast, the negative or libertarian model sees radical differences as expressed principally through private institutions—churches, synagogues, mosques, Democratic and Republican clubs, ethnic solidarity groups, culture societies, rifle clubs, advocacy groups—that range of groups whom Toqueville described as the basis for American society, even back in 1824. On this view, public culture remains relatively thin, even though government may be needed to ensure the freedom of the many voluntary groups within the city, enabling them to maintain thick, private cultures of their own behind their own walls, or garden walls, outside the public square. And on this view, the appeal of urban life is precisely its very lack of thick, common culture, its anonymity, its hidden spaces, its freedom from the intense gaze of neighbors in a small town, the liberation to nonconformity that comes from there being no common public culture after all. On this view, think of—to try to give an image for it—think of Walker Evans's subway photographs. The notion that to have privacy when you're in a small space with many others in dense proximity, you must avert your gaze, not to pry, not to look inside the lives of strangers, to maintain the illusion of privacy even in the most dense and confined of spaces. And on this view, the last thing you'd want to do if you've fled the farm for the big city is to have Walt Whitman sing you, and thereby out you to the folks back home.

Now let me try to illustrate the difference in these two approaches by coming back to my own ground of constitutional law. And I'd like to begin the dialogue we'll take up with Professor Katznelson in a moment by focusing on two recent constitutional controversies that I think help give us some experiments in urban toleration to work with, some concrete examples.

First, let's take that great annual ritual of March 17, the St. Patrick's Day parade. Now in both New York and in Boston—Boston, I might note, treats St. Patrick's Day as an official holiday. This is a remnant from a time when the city dealt with its heterogeneity through a kind of Irish takeover of civic institutions. They played the ultimate joke on the citizens of Boston by calling it Evacuation Day and pretending it was a celebration of an event from the Revolutionary War, but it is St. Patrick's Day. Now these St. Patrick's Day parades have caused the following kind of controversy. In both New York and Boston, gay Irish contingents sought to march in the parade. There's an ancient line of cases—not ancient, but a venerable line of cases—that says that one may not compel someone to speak against one's will or be associated with speech one doesn't agree with. This goes back to saying that Jehovah's Witnesses students may not be compelled to salute the flag in violation of their rights of conscience, and the St. Patrick's Day parade organizers in both cities said, "Well we don't want a gay contingent, a gay and lesbian Irish people of Boston contingent, or the equivalent in New York." It wasn't that they were saying that if you're gay you can't play in the fife and drum corps. What they were saying is they didn't want the expressive disruption of their message in the parade of having a gay contingent that would suggest that—withstanding religious condemnation of the majority of marchers in the parade—gay people were Irish, too.

Now the issue in this case was: Could the gay contingent be forced into the parade by city human-rights laws that express a robust notion of toleration, or was there an affirmative defense of freedom of speech and expression and association that the parade organizers had to have their parade on their own turf with their own messages? Now when the Supreme Court ultimately resolved this case (out of the Boston case, not the New York case), in a unanimous opinion they held that the parade could exclude—the St. Patrick's Day Parade organizers being a private parade organizer, even though they're using public turf—could exclude the gay contingent. And Justice Souter had a little bit of difficulty writing for the Court and saying exactly what the St. Patrick's Day parade stood for. He said, "Well, it doesn't really have a message, but then again, neither did Lewis Carroll's *Jabberwocky* or Arnold Schoenberg's music or Jackson Pollack's painting." And I'm not sure that Wacko Hurley and the boys in Boston appreciated those analogies at all about their parade. But the claim was that there was a right of free speech and association that led the parade organizers to be able to express St. Patrick's Day—their notions of ethnic and religious solidarity—in their way for their moment, without the city imposing a contingent of self-proclaimed gay marchers on the parade.

Now I believe that it would be in Professor Nussbaum's view the wrong outcome in that case, that the gay contingent should've been admitted to the parade, to make manifest the tapestry of mixed urban identity that includes out gay Irish people in public display as part of the St. Patrick's Day parade. I would believe that would be her view, and I'd love to hear later whether I've gotten that wrong. Let me say that the opposite negative view to which I have some considerable sympathy says that it was all right for the St. Pat's Day parade to exclude the gay group as a matter of

preserving control of its own message to the outside world. And did this mean that the gay Irish marching group was disrespected in its equal citizenship? Was it subjected to intolerance? I'd say not necessarily because, in the First Amendment worldview the Court expressed in holding for the parade organizers, the very beauty of its holding was that the St. Patrick's Day parade could exclude the gay marching band, but the Gay Pride Parade when it took to Fifth Avenue could exclude Anita Bryant or Cardinal O'Connor or any antigay contingent from its parade as a disruption of its message. So in other words, the vision is the street is neutral turf in which different groups can come at different times to express their own message without necessarily the toleration of others being forced within their own arena. It's an image of a shifting and kaleidoscopic array of different partial perspectives to be celebrated, rather than a patchwork quilt in which we celebrate them all at once.

Let me conclude with just a second example that I hope will elicit some dialogue and discussion in the discussion period. Consider the problem of vouchers from city funds to enable people to attend, if they wish, parochial schools, religious schools, as well as other private or public schools—the issue of how to reflect the fact that religious schools are doing a great deal of the city's educational function. And my own grandfather attended parochial schools not far from here, that when he went to them were all Irish. The city changed, the schools are still there, the population that attends them is not predominantly Irish and not predominantly Catholic, but those schools do a good job with kids that don't do well elsewhere. Many people think it's a wonderful policy to enable those schools to receive public funds, and yet we have an establishment clause that says we shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion. And the question is: Have we established religion if we include religious schools in the distribution of public funds?

Now the Supreme Court has said if a city wants to give vouchers for attendance to religious schools, that's OK; it does not violate the establishment clause. It's also said that if a city does not want to provide vouchers, it need not do so as a matter of compulsory free exercise protection. In other words, it's up to the cities.

But let me just pose to Professor Nussbaum a second challenge in addition to the St. Patrick's Day parade example, to think about whether—if the voucher is given to a student to attend a parochial school in the city—whether it should be a condition of attending the schools that participating private schools must agree not to discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic background, or to advocate or foster unlawful behavior, or teach hatred of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion. I read to you there the conditions that were imposed as a matter of policy in the Cleveland voucher program that the Court upheld in the Zellman case. You are allowed to take your voucher to parochial school, but if you did so, the parochial school was not allowed to be, well, too parochial; it had to be inclusive.

Now I take it that this sort of condition on vouchers would be acceptable or perhaps even compelled in Professor Nussbaum's really very stirring vision of what an appropriate civic culture of toleration would provide in its educative model. And I admire so greatly that she's trying to avoid the coercive model of Rousseau, to use the educative model of Mill. And I guess what I'm asking is at what point does the educative shade into the coercive, even if it's in the gentle of inducements, rather than coercion? Mill, not Rousseau? Her view, I take it, is that it will have a beneficial,

civilizing, and liberalizing influence on religion. It will help curb the religious rivalries that tear societies apart, that help us avoid becoming Beirut or Belgrade or Belfast, places where religion determines people's life prospects and locks them into ancient tribal animosities. On this very palatable and appealing view the government's role in distributing conditioned grants to religious organizations—and you could extend the argument from schools to soup kitchens or hospitals, if you like—it's benign at worst and it's educative at best, helping to tame the potentially unruly or narcissistic private religious sector, to guide it toward ever greater commonality and peace.

Now the alternative view—if you want to go back to the alternative view that is more suspicious of religious establishment and more protective of religious free exercise—it would recall that religions, like other private associations, are often biased, intolerant, exclusionary, zealous, and insular, comprising what Nancy Rosenbloom calls *partial publics*, *partial* in both senses of the word, universal in neither scope nor sympathy. On this view, government inducement to become more tolerant might appear a kind of insidious or colonizing influence, rather than a liberalizing and civilizing one. Something that tends to homogenize the rich diversity of religious viewpoints and ways of life, and perhaps do some leveling of faiths into something blander—more drained of color and vibrancy—than the normative pluralism the religion clauses were meant originally to protect, and undermining the dynamism that arises from a mix among diverse modes of being and conceptions of the good. On this view, I suppose, you would let Catholic schools stay Catholic (capital C) and let catholicity of education (small c) be the work of the public schools, and to keep radical separation between them, not allowing the public to support the private diversity.

So I close by sharing enormous sympathy with Professor Nussbaum's vision. And the image I'd like to leave you with to complement her image of Millennium Park is the image of the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia, a beautiful museum I commend to you and from which I just returned yesterday. It tries to create an image of "We the people." It takes the preamble of the Constitution as its architectural text; it's even inscribed on the outside of the wall: "We the people . . . , in Order to form a more perfect Union, . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution" But the brilliant architectural and artistic conceit of the building, and every display within it, is that *we the people* is a vibrant and expanded set of people. It takes the *we the people* who were the founders—locked in an airless room, who wrote the Constitution and were all white, propertied males—and extends through art and computer images and a constantly changing patchwork of faces, transforms the *we the people* to be all the people, immigrants, people of all races, faiths, ethnicities, genders, orientations. It's a beautiful image. It is the correct image of *we the people*. The question for our discussion is: Is it better that we all tolerate each other or that we express toleration in this richer affirmative sense that Professor Nussbaum describes?

Thank you very much.

Ira Katznelson: I think we should begin the discussion period by asking Professor Nussbaum for any reactions she has to Professor Sullivan's remarks.

Martha Nussbaum: These are wonderfully provocative comments. So let me just take a couple of minutes to give some reactions.

I guess first of all to describe the general idea that I favor. It's very similar in structure to John Rawls's idea of political liberalism—that is, that the political conception of a society is not morally empty, but it is partial, it's a partial moral conception that we can agree on as a basis for political society, living together. And as Rawls says, it's a module that you then attach to a whole lot of other things you believe, and there may be conflict in that attaching, but that's up to you to sort that out. But the idea that Rawls and I share is that no form of liberalism that's totally empty of moral content could ever be stable, and the key to that moral content has to be an idea of equal respect.

Now about negative liberty. I mean, I think Rawls already said this beautifully in *A Theory of Justice*. I actually think that that idea is incoherent. I mean if you think about a person who's left alone by the state, that person is not a free person. As Adam Smith already observed in *Wealth of Nations*, kids in England who didn't have compulsory education provided by the state were not free: they were working in factories because their parents sent them there and they worked the whole day and they didn't have the opportunity to develop their human potential in the way that the children in Scotland, who were coerced by the state, they were able to be free. So I think the issue of how you produce a free person is very complicated, but clearly, it involves strong state action in areas of education and economic empowerment, I would say, as well as the zealous protection of some other liberties. And freedom of association is very dear to me, as it is to Professor Sullivan.

About the public-private distinction, I also have problems with that one because I do believe that that distinction—I mean, she's of course quite right to say that Locke and Kant drew on that distinction to solve some of their problems, but, as Mill well knew, what that did was to shield violence against women and lots of other bad stuff that went on inside the family, and it gave it the cover-up of permissiveness. And so any liberalism that's really going to protect human freedom has got to consider that the family is part of the political structure of society, and then we have to think carefully how to balance respect for freedom of association against the promotion of safety, security, opportunity, development, for females and other vulnerable people in that structure. So those are my general views.

I guess I think that, in particular with some of the issues that our society is having most difficulty with today, a policy of "Oh, let's try to pretend that we're keeping our hands off," on the part of the state is just not adequate. If you think of the issue of how to include or tolerate people with disabilities, which is something that I've been thinking about a lot lately, well, first of all, the posture of state inaction is just a charade, because the state has got to design public space one way or another way. They've got to have wheelchair ramps or not wheelchair ramps. So they are always in the business of making choices. And if they say, "Oh state inaction, that just means we're going to leave the buildings the way they were without access for people with disabilities," it doesn't mean that they're really doing nothing.

In the case of sexuality, I think the tremendous amount of violence and stigmatization against same-sex couples and gay and lesbian people suggests that . . . my colleague Richard Epstein, a famous radical libertarian, wrote a very fine editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* against the gay marriage amendment, and I guess I was really moved by his growth and insight on that issue. But what he said is this shows the wisdom of "Let's just get the state out of it," and let's "Live and let live."

Now I think that's actually a rather contradictory position in the current situation. If the state really gets out of it, then people don't "live and let live." And whenever they're inclined to not "live and let live," we really need the state more rather than less. What I'm concerned with is the way that we introduce people to these things in childhood: How do teachers present disability in a classroom; how do they present issues of sexuality in the classroom? And I think you can't just keep away from all human topics, you've got to do it one way or the other.

Now about the two cases. I guess I want to say that I don't think my view solves any legal problems because I think both of those cases are hard cases where the freedom of association of individuals comes into tension with other values that the society is promoting. And I think the old adage that hard cases make bad law . . . but I think they certainly make bad philosophy, in the sense that you can say quite abstractly what the general structure is, and then when you come to a tough issue like abortion rights or something, it's not a sign that the principles are inadequate, [but] that the principles don't take you all the way to a clear one-sided solution to those cases. So I actually think that the cases are hard. And I guess about the education—I guess it's just to me the question ought to be, "What would public education contain, and what would public education involve?" Now as to state support for private education, that's a very complicated, mixed situation, and I really don't have clear intuitions about what should be permitted there. I guess—I think in Finland, where the church-run groups get money from the state all the time, but the understanding is that they're really promoting the same values as everyone else, so there's no tension, that's one thing. But in the U.S. we know that that's not the case and it's a much harder case.

Ira Katznelson: Let me just pose two questions. First is a question about Locke. The letter concerning toleration is probably my favorite text in the long lineage of Western political thought, and the reason it appeals to me so much is because of what might be called its sociological realism. He's commenting on a Europe torn apart by religious conflict, soaked in blood, and his line of solution did not lead through a reshaping of the human person first, it led first through a change in institutional rules, i.e., separation of church and state, limiting the role of the magistrate and the like. My question from that Lockean perspective, too simply put albeit, is, If we had to choose between, as it were, the pathway of education, reconstitution of the human person, addressing the baneful possibilities of emotions, like shame, or the character or narcissism, as opposed to thinking as hard as we can about reshaping our institutional milieu, why would we opt for the former as opposed to where Locke came out?

And the second question, perhaps not unrelated though loosely tethered to it, is the question about the scope of—you've written on this subject—the scope of humankind inside this common new civil, non-repressive civil religion. Because the wider the scope, the more we will bump up, not just in Boston or New York but globally, bump against groups whose very institutional rationale is that of building boundaries, setting conditions that distinguish them from others and who will resist that culture as a repressive imposition. So the question then is still Locke's question: How do groups like the Catholic Church, or the Reformation churches which surely had such crisp views, thick views about what was proper, how should they and could they be integrated into an institutional milieu without remaking themselves as groups or remaking their individuals as persons?

Martha Nussbaum: OK. Those are great questions.

About the first, I mean, look, I said—and I probably didn't stress it enough because I had to cut out a lot of things—that institutions are one very important part of how I think these values should be introduced into a society. Values of equal respect are expressed by a tax system, by a welfare system, by the presence or absence of health care and so on. So of course that's very, very important. And indeed I think there are certain problems that one cannot solve without a central role for institutions because there are collective-action problems. If you try to solve the problem of economic redistribution through private philanthropy, well, we know that it leads to tremendous collective-action problems, plus being quite unfair to the people who are good, that is, the ones who give away a lot of their money to the poor under that voluntary system are competitively disadvantaged vis-à-vis the ones who are selfish. And so for all those reasons coercive taxation seems to be the best way to solve the problem of redistribution. And I think a lot of problems of global justice—right now we're trying to solve them by a kind of system of private philanthropy, but much more coordination and institutional organization would be needed.

But you know, at the same time, you can't do it only by institutions because if people don't have the will to sustain them, they will change them. I mean I grew up, as you did too, in a time when there was a lot of parent consensus about the importance of social welfare, and even Richard Nixon supported universal health care for all Americans. Now why did that change? It changed because through the Reagan era, people lost the will to support that, and there was a new culture of competitive narcissism, I would say, that increasingly took over through the family and the schools and there wasn't enough done about that.

I mean again, to turn to India, which—I think it's sometimes more useful to talk about a nation that one isn't a citizen of, observing—what was it that Nehru did wrong? I think he built all the institutions right, but what he didn't do while the Hindu Right was busily organizing at the grassroots level, and having all these groups for boys that organized them into little bands, and had attractive games, and stories, and songs, and so on, all surrounding a vision of India as [a] Hindu-first place, the other side, so to speak, was doing nothing to mine the Hindu tradition for images of pluralism and toleration. Tagore was the only one who was doing it, but he was doing it in the Bengali language which was spoken mainly in Bengal, and it just didn't take over. And everyone now will say that, they say, "We have failed to build at the grassroots level a culture of pluralism and respect." But it could've been done if Nehru had had more respect for the arts and humanities. He thought technological education was the thing, and even though he read every book in the world and every poem in the world, he just didn't think it was an important part of creating a public culture. So that's the first thing.

Remind me of the second question.

Ira Katznelson: The scope question, and when you bump against . . .

Martha Nussbaum: Well, you know, I think that in every case you're going to have, I mean, since . . . all right, let me talk about my view rather than Rawls's view. My view says that what the common core of the political conception should be is a set of

opportunities, or as I call them "capabilities," that people will all have. Now that already leaves spheres of freedom for these groups you're talking about, because for example the Amish can happily support the right to vote, even though they believe it's wrong to vote. If the conception is that every citizen has to vote, then they have a problem with that. Again, people who think that religion is bunk, they can support freedom of religion as a very important part of the political conception, because they're aware that their fellow citizens will use that. So in general people can support lots of things at the level of capability or opportunity that they wouldn't support if the functioning were made basic.

Now then, I think then one isn't required to show that every group is going to feel no tension around these ideas. Some, if they have racism or hatred in their very structure, then those groups will be at odds with the political conception, and then what will happen is not that they will be suppressed if they do no harm to others, but that they're going to be—their position in the political order will be different from others in the sense that if they can't, as a piece of legislation, introduce their ideas because they go against the constitution. So if the Hindu Right introduces just a plain piece of legislation saying that Muslims will have only half the vote of Hindus, that just can't happen because it's against the values enshrined in the constitution. So they would have to change the constitution which is a more arduous matter and less likely to happen. But their speech won't be suppressed as long as they're [not] doing, or imminently threatening, harm to others. And so I think many hate groups exist in any society, and it's just a question of how far you go in protecting others from them, and I think the test should be something about the imminent likelihood of violence.

Ira Katznelson: We're up against a reasonable, hard time constraint of airplane schedules, but we have a few more minutes and I think what we'll do is take a small number of brief questions from the floor, and then give the two principals a chance to respond. I'm going to stand there because I can't see in this light.

Man: I was quite interested in Miss Sullivan's concept of timesharing. And I'm just wondering how that fits into New York City being a host, let's say, for the Republican National Convention, and maybe you timesharers don't allow any protests.

Kathleen Sullivan: Are you going to collect questions first?

Ira Katznelson: Let's collect two or three, and then . . .

Man: I was struck by a non-marking in the city which is not of the concept of toleration in the values of the market, thinking of this as being the city where the Dutch let the Jews in, where commerce and trade from in the seventeenth century—even religious intolerance.

Man: I was . . . Professor Nussbaum saying Kant's work on religion. The book in which he . . . women are inferior to men, and whites are superior to blacks, and sexually . . . even when the gays . . . husband and wife . . . of propagation is assault on women's rights, and I agree with Professor Sullivan who mentioned the categorical imperative . . . That's the point where Kant shows his toleration, not the source which you cited.

And one other point. The unique thing about John Rawls was incoherence.

Man: A practical question: Since 9/11 has intolerance increased or decreased in the U.S., and what are the factors driving that?

Kathleen Sullivan: The last question is quite profound. Let me start with that. Has intolerance in the United States increased or decreased since 9/11? And I think—I don't mean this as a lawyer's trick—I think the answer is both. Increased in the sense that suspicion of the other has been heightened in a way that doesn't happen when there's not a threat to security, when everybody's just going about their business and having a dot-com boom or something like that. And yet tolerance, I mean, I think the most striking thing, for all the criticism one might otherwise level at the administration's response in some respects to 9/11, and not just the administration, the Congress's response and the USA PATRIOT Act, for all the criticism one might level at some of the impositions on liberty in the wake of 9/11, one thing really didn't happen, and that is there is no return to notions of quarantine, internment, massive roundup. There are things to worry about in the immigration and deportation system, there are issues to worry about, about secret surveillance, but there's been a learning process from the internment of the Japanese and Japanese Americans in the wake of Pearl Harbor, and I think our learning from that experience of the incorrect application of intolerance to a very over-inclusive set of people, there may be some learning about intolerance. Now fear breeds intolerance, and this is something that Professor Nussbaum touched on, and fear may breed yet a kind of resurgence of intolerance that we haven't seen in the first bounce, and if there were another grave incident one can't predict. But I think it's interesting to note that some expressions of intolerance that we have used as a society in the past did not come out this time.

One respect to timesharing, I don't mean to suggest that it can only be one idea at a time in the streets. A parade is a unique form of public expression in which you probably can't have two parades marching at odds in the street at the same time. But there's nothing wrong with having events inside events in which there can be simultaneous critique and demonstration, and it would be a travesty of freedom of speech to say that one must wait one's turn to speak until there's no longer an occasion to be listened to.

Martha Nussbaum: Toleration and the market. It is often said, and I think it does happen sometimes, that when people really want to make money they waive these other animosities. I had an incident where my daughter and I went into a very conservative Muslim bookstore up on Devon Avenue in Chicago, and she was dressed in short shorts, and clearly they did want to ask her to leave. I mean they were looking very angrily at us, but when I came up, you know, we had this big pile of books that we were buying, then they waived all that, you know. So I think it does happen. But I'll tell you, if you study the history of the BJP, the party that was just defeated in the last election in India, it kind of puts the lie to that, because here are people who have both a very strong ambition to be the party of globalization and good business, and they've managed to get the support of most of the business community, and at the same time they are preaching hate in a very open way. And the younger ones more than the older ones. That's what's even more scary. I mean the more business-oriented and younger they are, they more they do that. So I don't know. I think we can't rely on that.

Kant on women. Well, it was actually in the *Lectures on Ethics* which is an earlier work. But you know, he did say that people use each other reciprocally in the sex act—he was quite neutral about that—and he said sex involved the instrumental use of others for pleasure. And some radical feminists have actually invoked that as something that's quite connected to worries about objectification that feminists have, although he might have been wrong about the solution, which was marriage. But about the big question about 9/11, I agree with Professor Sullivan that I think "both" is the answer. In the wake of the first alarm, there was tremendous inclusiveness, and there was respect for that gay rugby player who helped bring down the fourth plane, there was sympathy for people of all different national and ethnic origins who died, people in other parts of the country who didn't like New York were sympathizing with New York. But you know, I think that kind of died away and the more long-term suspiciousness of Muslims is what I'm particularly worried about, because I think it's very ignorant. You know, a lot of people that I talk to about these things think that all Muslims are Arabs, they think there's never been a democratic Muslim nation, and I say, "Well, what about—forget about the early democracies in the Middle East that were overridden by the British—but what about Bangladesh, what about the Muslim 15 percent in India?" And they don't know these things at all, and when I say that I'm writing a book about religious violence in India often people say, "Oh, what's the matter? Are the Muslims creating trouble there?" So you know, that's one reason I wrote the book because I kept getting that. And so I feel that there is this demonization of the Muslim Other, which I am very worried about. And I think education is very important, just to dispel some of the false factual information that people have. That's probably not enough, but at least it would be something.

Ira Katznelson: One parting observation. This is a session on toleration and cities in the twenty-first century. And one lesson of this very rich discussion is that the transformation of urbanism is such that all of humankind is now part of an urban fabric. And as we are all part of an urban fabric the questions of both tolerance and toleration, not identical words, presses forward at the top of not just any parochial but a broadly human agenda.

Thank you both very, very much.

SESSION 3: EQUALITY

Lisa Anderson: Good afternoon. I'm Lisa Anderson, and I will be moderating the final panel of the final symposium of Columbia's yearlong celebration of its 250th anniversary.

It's fitting to be talking about cities in this last symposium, housed as we are in one of the greatest urban agglomerations of all times, and fitting to be talking from a perspective that takes time seriously. Columbia was founded in a city both the same and unimaginably different from the one we live in now, and the prospects that our successors might convene again some two and a half centuries from now to reflect on urban life has the nice quality of making this symposium both historically significant—we will be in their archives—and appropriately modest in the scheme of things.

This afternoon we consider the consequences of urban life, and how we define urban life, for equality, and how we define equality. Partha Chatterjee will address some of these questions, in part, by telling us something about how soccer shaped conceptions of political agency and competence in Calcutta nearly a hundred years ago. Before I introduce him and our discussant, Richard Sennett, I'm compelled to remind you that sports are still driving much of the discussion of development, particularly in New York City today. Stadiums are imagined in Manhattan in Brooklyn, and teams are being lured in and out of the city. And I want to tell you a little story about this; take a minute for this. There is, of course, a major bid for the 2012 Olympics being mounted by New York City. Far be it for me to know exactly why we're doing this, but the deputy mayor's story of how he came to be convinced that New York should mount the bid, I think, is revealing for our theme this afternoon. He's an investment banker by background, and he was once persuaded by a client, much against his will, to attend a World Cup soccer game in New Jersey. He was stunned—and the way he tells it suggest he really was stunned—by the size and enthusiasm of the crowds of people supporting home teams from countries he had never heard of. His vision of New York was transformed that afternoon as he realized the extent to which New York is constructed of people from home countries he has not heard of. He concluded that this was something on which the city should capitalize, in all the possible meanings of that word. And there, the idea that sports could drive economic development—and that New York might be reflected in the international gathering of athletes that is the Olympics—was born. With that simple illustration of the complexity and immediacy of relationships between urban geography, economic aspiration, and social identities, let me introduce to you our speaker.

Partha Chatterjee is professor of political science at the Center for Studies in Social Sciences in Calcutta, India, and simultaneously professor of anthropology here at Columbia. He was a founding member of the enormously influential subaltern-studies group of historians. The subaltern-studies collective began as a group of historians in India who felt in the early 1980s that Indian history was limited because it adopted a nationalist perspective that neglected the perspectives and voices of those outside centers of power: peasants, workers, tribal people, women, and, I presume, soccer fans. In his lecture today, his research is almost entirely on India—more specifically on Bengal—but he makes points of acute importance to us all.

When he's finished speaking, Richard Sennett will comment. He, Richard Sennett, is professor of sociology at the London School of Economics, where he chairs the Cities Program, an interdisciplinary teaching and research program joining visual urban design to the social sciences. Before going to LSE about five years ago, he spent 25 years at NYU and he is widely known and equally widely respected for his work on the interconnections between authority, modernism, and public life. From Chatterjee's *The Nation and Its Fragments: Texts of Power and Wages of Freedom* to Sennett's *The Fall of Public Man*, *The Corrosion of Character and Respect*, *The Welfare State: Inequality and the City*, you have before you the authors of some of the most influential social science of our day, and I'm delighted to be able to introduce them.

Professor Chatterjee, the floor is yours.

Partha Chatterjee: Thank you very much, Lisa, for that wonderfully generous introduction. It is, in fact, a great honor to have been invited to participate in this symposium, especially to participate as a Columbia representative because I am, as Lisa explained, only partially affiliated here. I also wear several disciplinary hats, and for various reasons today I have decided to wear my historian's hat. And as a result I will not be able to give you a historical description of the twenty-first-century city. What I have decided to do is actually talk about the evolution of the city in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and, from that perspective, ask if that might have something to tell us about the prospects of equality in the twenty-first-century city.

Now in his well-known work *The Right to the City*, the sociologist-philosopher Henri Lefebvre has spoken of the way in which the ancient Greek and Roman city, providing an ideological model of the urban as a space of free citizenship, created in the new industrial cities of Western Europe in the nineteenth century the possibility of a democratic urbanity. "Urban life," he said, somewhat wistfully, "suggests meetings, the confrontation of differences, reciprocal knowledge and acknowledgement, ways of living, patterns, which coexist in the city." But urban democracy raised the specter of an equal right to the city that threatened the privileges of the ruling class. The latter responded by expelling the poor from the urban center and destroying urbanity. Lefebvre saw in this a class strategy that continued to operate in the twentieth century through urban planning, the governmental responses to the housing question, and the creation of new transportation links between the suburbs and the city. But he also qualified his historical theoretical argument by emphasizing its limits. "Let us leave aside," he said, "questions posed by the Oriental city, the Asiatic mode of production, 'town and country' relations in this mode of production, and lastly the formations of ideologies on this base. Only the Greek and Roman antique city from which are derived societies and civilizations known as 'Western' will be considered."

Now this raises an obvious question about the generality of the framework suggested by urban sociologists such as Lefebvre, or indeed of the frameworks proposed by his many critics. The lack of generality seems even more telling when we remember that most of the largest cities in the world today, especially those that grew most rapidly in the second half of the twentieth century, are not Western cities. Even though there have been attempts in recent years to think of the rise of these megacities within a general framework of the new forms of global capitalism (I'm thinking of Manuel Castells or David Harvey or Saskia Sassen, for example), they have achieved this generality at the cost of sacrificing the richness of the specific historical genealogies that sociologists of the city, from Max Weber to Henri Lefebvre, would have insisted upon. So either we have historical theories that are, at best, provincial in their restriction to Western Europe and North America, or else we have general theories that have little historical depth. That would seem to be the choice we are being offered.

This, I admit, is a somewhat obvious criticism that a postcolonial theorist might advance. But in today's talk, I would like to consider the argument that historical trajectories are becoming less and less important in the changing urban forms that we are seeing in most of the world at the beginning of the twenty-first century. And I was particularly struck by the discussions this morning on the Chinese cities—and we'll come to back to a discussion of this.

This is not so much a statement about determinate social forms emerging out of a common set of globally prevalent structural conditions, but rather as the description of a strategy. I take from Lefebvre the idea that the modern Western city is the site of a struggle over free and equal citizenship, but free citizenship is not what has been realized. Rather, different groups and classes employ different strategies by using different economic, ethical, and aesthetic arguments to press their often-conflicting claims to a right to the city. These strategies build on the different historical genealogies of the city in different parts of the world. Postcolonial historiography has—I believe—have enough to demolish the notion that the evolution of modern Cairo, Delhi, and Shanghai can be understood within some common framework of the Oriental city. Specific historical genealogies are important in understanding the strategies that may be adopted by colonial or postcolonial elites, or by the urban poor in these cities. But specific histories may also explain why at a certain juncture, the irrelevance of history might become part of the economic or aesthetic arguments deployed by particular classes to press their claims over the future of the city.

It is one such historical genealogy of a contemporary twenty-first-century urban strategy that I will talk about today. The genealogy involves the transition from embryonic forms of early modernity, quickly aborted, to a specifically colonial form of modernity, moving further into a postcolonial nation-state formation that is now struggling to emerge out of the crisis precipitated by the latest waves of globalized production and exchange. The city is Calcutta, where I was born and where I continue to live and work when I am not at Columbia.

There was, I believe, the emergence in Calcutta in the early nineteenth century of certain distinctly urban forms of sociality that I prefer to call early modern. These were different from the traditional social structures prevalent in rural Bengal or the urban institutions and practices prevalent in the precolonial cities of northern India. But more significantly, they were also different from the characteristically colonial forms of urban modernity that have become more familiar to us from the second half of the nineteenth century. The distinction I am making between the early modern and the colonial modern has not been much noticed in modern Indian historiography, so that it is difficult for me to establish it persuasively in the space of this talk. But let me sketch an outline.

Of historians of Calcutta, only S. M. Mukherjee has seen the distinctive features of the new urbanity that struggled to emerge in the city in the first three decades of the nineteenth century, even though he did not draw the conceptual distinction that I am now making. Mukherjee pointed out first the new institutional form of the association, called societies or associations in English, or in the Bengali equivalents of *shabha* or *samiti*. These were, of course, associations of wealthy or propertied elite groups, but they were now of mixed caste and even religious composition, based on free membership and acting as debating societies, organizations of social reform, and promoters of causes and even political agitation.

Second, while some of these societies were floated by reformers who held unorthodox religious views or espoused the breaking of taboos and social conventions, many were also run by highly orthodox people who nevertheless used the new associational form to launch campaigns and create new institutions in the city. It was a group of such orthodox leaders who teamed up with European

businessmen and professionals to start in 1817 the Hindu College that was to have such a profound role in the spread of modern Western education and culture in eastern India. Indian elites and nonofficial Europeans also combined to create the societies that spread the new schools and produced the new textbooks in the 1820s and 1830s.

Third, it was in these decades that the new Indian press, in English as well as in the Indian languages, established itself as a political weapon, campaigning for social, religious, and political causes; criticizing the government; and frequently bringing upon itself the wrath of the colonial authorities. Here, too, it is significant that Indian elites and European businessmen and professionals often combined to criticize the colonial government. The protest meeting at the town hall in 1823 in Calcutta against measures to restrain the press from criticizing officials was said to have been attended by almost 1,000 people, including both European and Indian notables. European free traders joined with Indian reformers, as well as conservatives, to demand the end of the East India Company's trade monopoly, the protection of land and property, and, interestingly, the settlement of Europeans in India. There is no doubt that Calcutta in the early nineteenth century, then inhabited by about 200,000 people, developed a new social space for the activities of an urban public mixed in its racial, religious, and caste composition, and led mainly by the wealthy businessmen of the city that sought to claim and protect the rights of the public against the ruling authorities headed by the governor-general and his council.

The second new institutional feature in this period was the emergence of parties, each led by a wealthy Bengali magnate. The parties were called *dal*, which is exactly what political parties are called today, although in the early nineteenth century there was obviously nothing resembling the political parties we are familiar with today. Once again, Mukherjee has studied the phenomenon closely. He notes that there were five major parties and several minor ones in Calcutta at this time. Most were led by men from the upper castes, even though in some cases their entry into the ranks of the ritually elevated castes was recent and clearly influenced by the exercise of power and financial inducements. Some parties were led by men belonging to ritually low trading castes, but the membership of the parties was quite mixed in their caste composition and it was common for ritually superior Brahmans to accept the leadership of a ritually inferior *Kayastha* or *Tili* or *Subarnabanik* party leader. In all cases, the chief qualification for becoming the leader of a party was wealth and political access to the ruling British authorities. Membership of these parties was voluntary and people were known to leave a party to join a rival one. Mukherjee notes that the function of the party leader, *dolopati*, carried traces of the traditional functions of kingship. Thus, he was supposed to enforce the rules of religion and caste among the members of his party; punish offenders and reward the meritorious; and settle disputes over property, inheritance, and marriage. He had the power to ostracize those who seriously violated religious or caste injunctions, and members were prohibited from maintaining any social relations with the ostracized family. The party leader also took over another erstwhile royal function, that of patronizing scholarship and the arts. Many significant publishing ventures of the period—including journals, dictionaries, and translations of Sanskrit classics, and new genres of popular music and theater—were organized and promoted by the leading magnates in the city, often in a spirit of mutual competition.

There was also a hint of sovereign power in the regular use of armed retainers to keep the urban poor under control. Artisans and other service groups in the city were under the patronage of wealthy magnates who frequently used force to collect rents, evict recalcitrant tenants, and prevent disorder during public festivals.

Now it's easy to read in the activities of these early-nineteenth-century parties and leaders a carryover of older social forms associated with landlords in rural Bengal. But the elements of novelty should not be missed. None of the urban magnates could claim even a figment of traditional political legitimacy, either by lineage or by military power. Even as they adopted and flaunted many of the Persianate styles of the northern Indian aristocratic culture, the forms of power that these magnates exercised and the institutions they built in the city were quite novel. Even for ordinary inhabitants of Calcutta, it was widely observed that life in the new city was different from anything that had been previously experienced.

Kalikata kamalalay [Calcutta, Abode of the Goddess of Wealth], this is a book written in 1823, and it's possibly the first text of urban sociology in India. It divided the urban classes into wealthy aristocrats, middling householders, poor but respectable persons, and the laboring poor. The author Bhabanicharan, a scholarly Brahman, had made a career for himself as a professional writer and journal editor, perhaps the first one in India. He was a leading figure in the new urban public life of debate and social campaign. His book, he says in his preface, was addressed to visitors to Calcutta from rural areas and small towns who found the ways of the new city utterly incomprehensible. His burden was to show that there was indeed an ethical way of living in the city, even though it was in many ways different from the traditional practices of the countryside. He provided the first elaborate description of the new politics of the *dal*, of parties.

Yes, wealth and power, he admitted, had much greater importance in Calcutta than at other places, but no one confused this new secular order of social status with the traditionally prescribed ritual order to precedence that was still respected but kept separate. The novelty of life in Calcutta lay in the unprecedented opportunities of social mobility that it offered. Lowly peddlers and shopkeepers could become wealthy aristocrats in the course of a single generation. Similarly, respectable people fallen into bad times could afford to take up menial or disreputable occupations because of the anonymity that the city offered. In short, greater freedom and greater equality than in the traditional order, a place of social churning, perhaps a place also of the emergence of new moral norms. Scholar that he was, Bhabanicharan noted the plethora of new Persian and English words that had entered the everyday Bengali language spoken in Calcutta. He defended the new practice, saying that there was nothing wrong in it as long as the language of religious ritual was kept uncontaminated.

I have spoken before of the rise of a new public domain in the early nineteenth-century Calcutta, where Indian and European notables could come together to criticize the government authorities and claim their rights as free subjects of the British monarch. It is tempting to speculate if this was the same tendency that had produced in the same historical era the political movements that led to the overthrow of empire in North and South America. Certainly, leading Indian intellectual figures such as Rammohun Roy believed in the existence of the public, and intrinsically urban, domain of freedom and equality, restricted by the economic and educational

qualifications of responsible citizenship, but undivided by distinctions of race or color. So did the Eurasian poet and journalist Henry Derozio, the charismatic leader of the free-thinking young Bengal movement.

However, the authorities of the colonial government clearly wanted none of this. Driven by the specters of America and France, they were deeply suspicious of revolutionism. They imposed censorship on the press, deported troublesome European journalists, and actively discouraged the coming together of Europeans and Indians in associations that could make political demands in the public sphere.

The main features of the colonial modern, of course, have been widely discussed in the literature on colonialism and nationalism and are well known. I will date this period from the middle decades of the nineteenth century. It was at this time that the Indian economy became a characteristically colonial economy. The flow of colonial trade had been reversed from the export from India of textiles and luxuries, which was the earlier pattern, to the import of industrial manufactures and the export of primary agricultural products. The structures of colonial agrarian property, revenue, credit, and commodity exchange were also fully in place. Politically, the British bar had been established as paramount all over the subcontinent. Intellectually, the institutions of colonial education spread as the breeding ground of new cultural styles and movements that created the Indian middle classes and shaped an entire range of nationalist responses to colonial rule. The colonial modern has a recognized shape as a formation and a period in South Asian history. It also exerts the full weight of its dominance over all discussions of south Asian modernity after the middle of the nineteenth century.

The city is, of course, the place of the colonial modern. That was where the new Indian middle classes, through their encounter with colonial rule, created the institutions and modes of thought and practice that would characterize nationalist modernity. However, the emergence of the colonial modern was also accompanied by a split in the urban public sphere. Unlike the earlier period—when there were many institutions and initiatives in which European and Indian residents of cities were partners—the second half of the nineteenth century saw the marking of a strong socially enforced dividing line between the British rulers and their Indian subjects. Correspondingly, the new institutions of nationalist modernity were founded on what was defined as a separate domain of national culture from which the alien rulers were excluded.

But it is important to emphasize that these racial dividing lines between rulers and ruled were kept in place not by publicly declared rules of segregation. There was no apartheid system in the cities of colonial India. On the contrary, the civic regulations and urban institutional structures were based on what the historian Patrick Joyce has called "the rule of freedom," with the qualification that it was subject to another rule, the one that I have elsewhere described as the rule of colonial difference. The rule of freedom justified the deployment of the new, more liberal techniques put in place in British cities in order to govern urban populations and make them more healthy, peaceful, and productive. This is the liberal project that produced the detailed urban censuses and maps; the new systems of piped water supply, underground sewers, garbage removal, and disposal of the dead; the public libraries and publicly supervised school systems, the avenues and parks, street lighting and public

transport, and elected municipal government, all of this in the nineteenth century, of course.

All of these techniques were applied in the city of Calcutta in the second half of the nineteenth century. Yet the rule of colonial difference ensured that the difference between white town and native town was known and observed by all residents. That official maps and directories specified the individual details of every house and its residents in the European wards—and only large classes of population in the native wards—that schools for European or Eurasian students and those for native students were supervised by different boards.

Let me show you a couple of maps. This is broadly a conceptual map around the middle of the nineteenth century, where you see the river on the left and the city is mostly a north-south settlement. The one on the south is white town or European town, the one on the north is native town, Indian town, and there's a section in the middle which is called intermediate here, which is largely business, commercial districts, less residential than the other two areas.

But this is an official map from 1825. This shows a section of a European ward, and each dark space is actually a house, a single house, with its compound or lawns, gardens, etcetera. And there's an accompanying directory which lists the resident of each single house here. This is the European ward and this is what it looks on the map. Now to the same scale, an Indian ward. This is what it looks like, and the dark spaces are not single houses at all. They are settlements of huts all together, usually huts, and there is no directory except for the houses of particular rich, wealthy people. The entire . . . in fact, you will see there is no demarcation of single plots at all in this map.

The criteria by which the colonial could be declared as the exception to the universal rule were diverse. Sometimes it would be the difference between public and private, so that clubs or swimming pools could be reserved for whites only because they were regulated by rules made by private associations. In other cases, dress, demeanor, or even suspicious behavior could allow the police to prevent most classes of the native population from walking down particular streets or public places frequented by Europeans. An 1821 order from the governor, for instance, states: "Considerable inconvenience is experienced by the European part of the community who resort to the what is now called Strand Road from the crowds of native workmen and coolies who make a thoroughfare of the walk. His Lordship is pleased to direct that natives shall not in future be allowed to pass the Sluice Bridge between the hours of five and eight in the morning and five and eight in the evening." Now no blanket segregation this, only a rule of exception purporting to apply to particular population groups for specific time periods.

Or take this as another example. When work began in 1859 on an underground sewage system for Calcutta, the white town in the south of the city was the first to get it, and I'm quoting from an official report: "It has been hinted that the Europeans acted somewhat selfishly in commencing these works in their own quarter of the town. Where it was pointed out that the prevailing winds being from the south every improvement in the European quarter benefits the whole town, whereas the same can not be said of improvements in the northern division."

One of the most significant developments in the urban history of Calcutta in the late nineteenth century was the extension of the rule of freedom into the so-called black town in the north. This was a classically colonial process in which the moral project of modernity was wrested from the hands of the alien rulers by new nationalist elite. Sumanta Banerjee has described the process by which a vibrant popular culture of the streets was suppressed and tamed in the Calcutta of this period to produce the genteel urban high culture of the new Bengali middle class. In the early decades of the nineteenth century, the streets served as an open marketplace. Peddlers and beggars jostle with gamblers and prostitutes. All roads and open spaces were potential sites of public entertainment. Religious festivals were observed by processions, music, ritual performances, and public revelry on the streets. Rijaluddin a Malay traveler from Penang, described the streets of Calcutta in 1810 as being full of entertainers such as snake charmers, puppeteers, gymnasts, trapeze artists, and fakirs showing tricks with monkeys, goats and bears. He also observed that the brothels and drinking houses were frequented by men of all races—English, Portuguese, French, Dutch, Chinese, Bengalis, Burmese, Tamils, and Malays. A famous satirical sketch from the middle of the century describes the brothel districts as places where it was impossible to tell the respectable man from the lowborn, because everyone wore the same fashionable clothes.

By the 1860s, however, the campaign was on to cleanse the streets of these noisy, obscene, and allegedly barbaric forms of entertainment. A guidebook published in 1886 warned rural visitors to the city that although the streets of Calcutta were open equally to all members of the public, those straying onto the carriageway were liable to be struck by a whip from a passing coach. Or unsuspecting men urinating on the roadside—a perfectly natural thing to do—might have had to spend the night in a police lockup. Popular festivals with performances such as body piercing and swinging from hooks were sought to be banned. Pantomime floats with ribald and satirical singing were removed from the streets, and brothels and liquor shops were put under strong surveillance. This was not merely the work of a colonial government driven by the evangelism of a civilizing mission. The new Bengali middle class was equally keen to create a new moral order of genteel civility, cleansed of the coarseness and vulgarity of the popular culture of the streets and the marketplace.

In the remaining part of this talk, I will describe the conflicting strategies adopted by different urban groups in Calcutta in two specific arenas of public entertainment: theater and football. This will I hope illustrate what I said at the beginning about the importance of specific historical trajectories in understanding the struggles over claiming equal rights to the city.

English theater came to Calcutta as early as the eighteenth century. Several playhouses opened over the years. Most were short lived and all were run by expatriate amateurs. Even in the early decades of the nineteenth century, female parts were played by male actors because actresses were not allowed on stage. I'm quoting. "The code of directors"—this is the code of directors of the East India Company—"feared that handsome actresses in India might arouse a spirit of intrigue among the junior servants of the Company." And doubtless, in those days, when English women were so scarce, the advent of actresses would have created a great stir and possibly led to scandal. By the 1830s, however, there were a few theaters with professional actors and actresses, some with experience of the professional stage in Europe. Apart from British officials and businessmen, even Indian notables

of the city, such as Dwarkanath Tagore, participated in the management of these theaters. Although Shakespeare and Italian opera were performed from time to time, the staple was light comedy and farce.

By the middle of the century, with the spread of English education among Indians in the city and the strong emphasis in the curriculum on English literature, Bengali young men with a college background began to be attracted to the English playhouses. It was expensive; as one of these Bengali members of the audience tells us, a ticket could cost as much as 16 rupees—which was more than a month's salary for most office employees—and a drink of brandy and soda from the bar cost four rupees. But they still went. Brought up on a fare of open-air performances in the round on mythological and devotional themes—or on the song, dance, and pantomime of the popular street culture—the new class of Indian men educated in the Western style began to dream of entirely new expressive possibilities in the tightly framed drama of the proscenium stage.

In 1848 there was apparently a minor sensation when it was announced that James Barrie of the Sans Souci Theater was producing Shakespeare's *Othello* with "a native gentleman" playing the Moor of Venice and Mrs. Anderson, daughter of the city's most famous actress, in the role of Desdemona. On opening night there was a commotion in front of the theater on Park Street with coaches and buggies going in all directions, people muttering, "By Jove! Barrie and the Nigger will make a fortune." But the gates were shut and rumors were flying that Barrie was drunk; that Othello, enjoying his sword, had struck himself; or that Desdemona had eloped with a general of the army. The next day it was revealed that three of the actors who were army officers had been forbidden by their commanding officer to go on stage, and that the police were waiting to arrest Barrie if he did not stop the performance. It was never official clarified why the brigadier issued the order, but the consensus was that he did not approve of his officers appearing on stage with a native actor in the company of European actresses. Barrie was, however, an enterprising man. In two weeks he had replaced the army officers with new actors. *Othello* opened to mixed responses.

The *Bengal Hurkaru*, which was the most popular English newspaper of the time, was polite and patronizing. "[I]f the indulgent approval of the audience is to be taken as a criterion of success Baboo Bustomchurn Addy, this is the Indian actor, can have no cause to complain. Unquestionably there is ample room for improvement, little reason to despair. Experience will do much, for deprived of good models as the student has hitherto been, we are bound to make every allowance and to look with favorable eyes upon this dramatic offshoot of the native body."

The *Englishman*, however, was less charitable: "In the delivery . . . , the effects of imperfect pronunciation were but too manifest. This was to be expected, but not to the extent it occurred. Scarcely a line was intelligible." On a later performance, the *Englishman's* criticism was damning: "Whether our Native friend judged wisely or well in selecting so difficult a task, we will not venture to discuss, but that he failed in every sense of the word, both in conception and execution, we think everybody present must admit."

Not fortunately or unfortunately, this was the last time that an Indian actor played a leading part in a theater for Europeans in Calcutta. I say fortunately because instead

of killing the enthusiasm of educated Bengalis for the stage, the sad experience of Baishnabcharan Addy only confirmed their conviction that they had to have a public theater of their own. After several short-lived amateur playhouses, the first professional proscenium theater for Bengali plays opened in Calcutta in the early 1870s. Amritalal Basu, one of the pioneers, describes in his memoirs how meticulously they studied the English theaters of the city in order to replicate the details of sceneries, props, lighting, orchestra—even the number of folds on the curtain. The only thing the Bengali Public Theater did not have was a bar.

By the late 1870s there were four or five theaters in the northern, entirely Indian part of the city competing with one another for the patronage of a Bengali-speaking public. The average price of a seat was a rupee in the front stalls and eight annas, that's half a rupee, in the rear—still expensive, but affordable for a large section of the city's residents and visitors prepared to splurge a little for a special evening's entertainment.

It is important to realize the significance of this expansive character of the theatergoing urban public. The Bengali Public Theater was created by and for the new English-educated Bengali middle class because it could not find a place in the English theater of the city. But the new audience it created was much wider than the educated middle class itself, including, as it did, poorer residents and visitors to the city who had never been to school or college and a large number of women from middle-class homes who at this time had no formal education. Indeed, in deference to the prevailing norms of gender segregation, several theaters reserved the entire balcony section for women and provided female ushers to communicate with the men of their families sitting in the stalls. Of the different forms of cultural production that were deployed in this period to spread modernity and nationalism, therefore, the theater certainly had a far broader reach than either the novel or the newspaper. Even though the Bengali Public Theater was consciously modeled on the European stage, the differences in the nature of the urban public quickly moved it into aesthetic and technical directions that were quite different from those of modern European theater. Historical romance became the most popular of the many adaptations of European dramatic genres, with many Shakespearean motifs being freely employed, even though Shakespeare's plays themselves did not prove to be very successful. Satire and farce were also very popular, in which Molière and English comedy-hall routines were mixed with the pantomime and street-performance genres of Calcutta's urban popular culture. A new genre was the mythological, adapted for the proscenium stage from the devotional performances of Bengal's traditional Vaishnava sectarian culture. Most genres, even the historical romance, wove into their narrative structure the device of song and dance. On the first-anniversary celebration of the National Theater in 1873, the dramatist Manomohan Basu warned the enthusiasts of modern theater not to be swayed by the absence of song and dance in the high dramatic tradition of the West. He was saying, "India is not Europe. European society is very different from our own society. European tastes are entirely different from our native tastes." He reminded his audience: "In this country we can not accomplish anything at any time at any place without singing a song." The elimination of song and dance from the new theater, he thought, would be too radical an innovation. "We are moderates," he announced. "We would like not to destroy all our native traditions, but to reform them. We would like to reduce the frequency the songs in the traditional *jatra* performance, modify their manner of singing, and incorporate them into the appropriate narrative form of

the theater." His advice was heeded. The Calcutta Theater—like the Parsi Theater of Bombay and the later forms of the Indian popular cinema, which many of you are familiar with—succeeded in developing an entirely new language of dramatic narration that employed the song as a crucial rhetorical device.

Several of the new theatrical genres were used to spread the message of social reform and nationalism. The power of the theater in reaching a wide urban public was palpable. Within four years of the launching of the first Bengali Public Theater, the colonial government enacted in 1876 a law to give itself the right to prohibit any dramatic performance that, in its opinion, was "scandalous, defamatory, seditious, obscene, or otherwise prejudicial to the public interest." The law was frequently used. In turn, the theater developed new methods of deception and subterfuge, often cloaking its message of anticolonial nationalism in an anachronistic historical plot or inserting fervently patriotic songs into a benign romance.

Another borrowing from the European stage had radical social implications. The Bengali Public Theater introduced women actors. They were drawn from among the professional singers and dancers living in the brothels of the city. It was a remarkable pedagogical project in which gentleman producers trained their illiterate actresses to play the sophisticated heroines and mythological goddesses featured in the new theater. The project did not meet with universal approval. The same dramatist Manomohan Basu, who I quoted earlier, poured scorn: "At last prostitutes have been accorded public and equal rights with respectable men in respectable society. At last the eyes and ears of the Bengali audience have been gratified, and the new universal ethical society, like the newly laid sewers of Calcutta, have acquired both fragrance and speed." This time, though, his admonition was ignored. Despite the stigma of their origins, actresses of the Calcutta stage often found fame, money, and a certain recognition as professional artists. That itself was new and an entirely urban occupational category.

The Calcutta theater is a good example of the strategic politics of the emerging nationalist elite of a colonial city. Denied equal participation in a racially neutral civil society, the nationalist elite proceeded to carve out a separate public cultural sphere for itself. But in doing so, it also sought to reach out to a wider urban public, to educate it in its new and sophisticated tastes, and to persuade it to listen to the new doctrines of social reform and nationalism. Of all the means employed by the new nationalist elite to create a base of mass support in the cities, the theater was one of the most effective.

Let me bring this story of the urban public domain—and the competing strategies adopted by different groups and classes to claim an equal place in it—to our contemporary times by telling you something about the history of soccer in Calcutta.

Like other things British and urban, soccer—or associational football, to use its proper name—began in Calcutta soon after its emergence in British cities. Being a largely working-class sport, it was played in the late nineteenth century by British soldiers stationed in India and by Europeans and Eurasians in the railways, the police, and other services. It was also adopted enthusiastically by rapidly growing numbers of Indians who started neighborhood football clubs in cities like Calcutta. The best white teams played against each other on the grounds of Fort William, the

citadel of British colonial power in the heart of the city. The Indian teams played barefoot in sundry open spaces in the native quarters.

In 1889 a trades cup was launched to be played by bona fide football clubs only. Lo and behold, one Indian club was allowed to compete. It lost in the first round. In 1893 the Indian Football Association was started to run an IFA shield tournament along the lines of the FA cup. Each year, two or three Indian teams were allowed to play, even though Indians had no place in the association itself.

It is important to appreciate the strategic location of this new arena of competitive sport in the public space of the colonial city. The IFA Shield was played on the fort grounds, supervised by an association of white clubs and by white referees. The competitors were mostly British regimental teams from different cantonments all over India. But because it was an open tournament, Indian clubs also had the right to compete. The rule of freedom, in other words, had to apply. But as always, it was subject to the rule of colonial difference. In this case, the criterion invoked was a limit on the number of local teams that could be allowed to join without curtailing the number of visiting teams and thereby jeopardizing the "all-India" character of the tournament. For several years, only two or three Indian teams from Calcutta were allowed to play for the IFA Shield. The turning point in the history of Calcutta soccer—and, some say, in the history of nationalism itself in Bengal—was the astonishing victory in the Shield final of 1911 of Mohun Bagan, a club located in the northern quarters of the city over the East Yorkshire Regiment. The stands in the ground could seat only about four or five thousand, and these spectators were almost entirely white. Outside, it was reported, there were nearly 100,000, most of whom saw nothing of the game and were informed of its progress by kites in the sky bearing the latest score.

The symbolic part of this victory over a British military team of 11 barefoot young men from the city was incalculable. It probably served to underscore the belief that despite the patent unfairness of the rule of colonial difference, the rule of freedom could still provide the opportunity to colonize people, to assert its claim to equality in the public spaces of urban modernity.

Equality in the city, as I have already indicated, was not merely a problem between British rulers and Indian subjects. There continued to be great differences in the twentieth century between different sections of Indians—divided by class, caste, gender, and religion—in terms of their place in the city. By the 1930s, not only the open Shield tournament, but also the premiere football league in the city had been opened to a few Indian teams, even though the championship was still dominated by white teams. The next transforming moment, however, was the rise of Mohammedan Sporting Club, which won the football league for five successive years from 1934 to 1938. This was not simply the assertion of a minority religious group in the public life of the city, which is how the story is usually told. It was also the claim of a section of the urban poor to belong to the city not merely at the sufferance of the wealthy elites, but as it were in their own right. Mohammedan Sporting recruited players mostly, but not exclusively Muslim, from all over India, but they commanded a mass following among the Muslim poor that was unprecedented. Few could afford to buy tickets for all the matches, but thousands thronged the ramparts of the fort, standing on top of boxes and even bicycles, or peering through handmade periscopes to catch a glimpse of the action. Don't go away, I have a few photographs of this.

There are several books of memoirs that talk of how Muslim grocers and vendors and employees of restaurants would endlessly entertain the players of Mohammedan Sporting, refusing to accept money from their idols, who—by defeating both British and middle-class Hindu teams—had given them at least a taste of dignity in their wretched urban lives.

The image of a few thousand legitimate spectators within the football ground and many more thousands outside—without tickets but still participating in the event—is, I think, an accurate picture of the new social form of a postcolonial city like Calcutta as it emerged through the middle of the twentieth century. This was the period of the population explosion. In Calcutta, the partition of India led to an influx of refugees from East Pakistan that quadrupled the population of the city and its suburbs in two decades. They camped down in refugee settlements and squatter colonies, mostly outside the margins of legality, and tried to make a livelihood by joining the burgeoning informal economy. Like the spectators on the fort ramparts, they were given a place in the city even though they could not be treated on the same footing as proper law-abiding citizens.

I have elsewhere described the mode of affiliation of these population groups to the public life of the city as political society, as distinct from the legally approved associational forms of civil society. They lived on illegally occupied land, traveled on public transport without buying tickets, used illegal electricity connections, and yet the civic authorities tolerated their presence, even supplying water and drainage and providing food rations, health services, and schools because they were a part of the urban population that had to be governed. The story is one of a differentiated, politically negotiated application of the rule of freedom to the urban population. It recognized the democratic claims to equal rights in the postcolonial nation-state, but differentiated between those were proper citizens and those who were not.

On the football ground, the rise of East Bengal Club as the chief public institution asserting the identity of the refugees from East Pakistan was the most important event in the postcolonial period. With the British teams no longer in the picture, East Bengal emerged as the principal competitor to Mohun Bagan and Mohammedan Sporting. The club had an overwhelming mass following in the refugee settlements of the city. Hundreds of overflowing buses would carry thousands of supporters, waving their red and yellow flags, from the dingy squatter camps to the football grounds located in the very heart of urban power and privilege. When East Bengal won, the stands would light up with rows of flaming torches set against the falling dusk. The torch was the club's icon. When hundreds of them lit up the Eden Gardens stadium, it was a sign that the refugees had come to stay and were determined their claims to the city. The domestication of East Pakistan refugees into the social fabric of Calcutta is one of the most remarkable stories of urban history anywhere in the twentieth century. They overwhelmed the native population by their numbers. They fought against and sometimes thrived in the long-standing and deep-seated cultural prejudices that marked them as rustic, clannish, unsophisticated, or quarrelsome. They competed fiercely for scarce economic resources. They radicalized the politics of the city and yet, unlike Karachi or Beirut or the towns of Jordan, there was never any political conflict between locals and immigrants. Today, the story of the refugees is already a distant memory, a story that grandparents tell on a rainy day. My hunch is that football and East Bengal Club had a great deal to do with the domestication of a potentially troublesome people. I was one of them.

The postcolonial city of middle-class neighborhoods jostling with working-class slums and refugee colonies is now giving way to high-rise apartment blocks and shopping malls. The spine of the city is shifting to a set of new highway corridors to the east, connecting the campuses of the information-technology companies with the airport. A lot of what I saw in the morning on Chinese cities reminded me of exactly what's going on in parts of Calcutta, these new sections of Calcutta. History is now seen mostly as a matter of preserving the colonial architectural heritage that might lend charm to the city and attract tourists. The image of Calcutta symbolized by Mother Teresa is now an embarrassment. The future is said to lie in the new global city of IT professionals and IT-enabled services seeking to seize the trades and jobs outsourced by companies in Western countries. A large part of the so-called informal sector or wage labor—so long tenuously integrated into urban life through their negotiations in political society—now face the risk of becoming redundant in the new economy. Already, decades-old squatter settlements are being daily dismantled, more by persuasion and some financial inducement rather than by force, and apparently with little resistance.

The Public Theater in North Calcutta is now virtually dead. East Bengal and Mohun Bagan still retain a popular following, but more in the district towns, not in middle-class Calcutta where young men and women—if they watch football at all—switch on to the English or Spanish Premier League on cable television.

Will the Calcutta of the twenty-first century be a pale copy of some standard model of the global city? If the past is any guide, I suspect not. Equality is a capacious and complicated concept, and the desire to have it can lead to the invention of many unsuspected strategies. Calcutta did not become just another British city in the nineteenth century. I doubt that it will become just one more global city in the twenty-first.

Let me just show you just a few pictures taken from old newspapers—so they're extremely grainy—on football.

This is a photograph from 1923, and it shows—this is the stands inside the ground, and you'll notice almost all these spectators are white.

These are the people who couldn't get in.

And these are what I said, people standing on bicycles. Outside the ground, of course.

This is what it looks like outside the ground.

Most of these are from the 1920s.

Such a common sight, on top of the lamppost.

This is a cartoon published in *Manchester Guardian* after the 1911 Shield victory of Mohun Bagan. I don't know if you can read it. But the kites in the sky, and the contrast between the white players with boots and Indian players barefoot.

This is a section of the Mohammedan Sporting spectators. Now these are inside the ground, 1930s.

And this is watching through periscopes. See those little boxes, completely handmade, made of wooden contraptions and little mirrors. They would be available on rent outside the ground.

OK, thank you.

Richard Sennett: Professor Chatterjee and I arranged that at the end of this long day that I would complement this very, very rich account with short—and I promise it will be short—comments on equality in cities today of a more general character. And I really want to just talk to you about, briefly, about three issues. They're all framed by the fact that in the last generation we've had an explosion in global capitalism, an era of wealth-generation around the world that really has almost no historical precedent. And it has created forms of inequality in cities which require some thought because they're in some ways new, in some ways they're historical survivals that are very veiled to us, but we don't very much understand how they operate.

I'm going to talk about, just briefly mention, three of these problems of inequality that this enormous explosion of the last generation has produced. One has to do with the very phenomenon of big—of growth, the second has to do with the urban geography of inequality, and the third has to do with class structure. Now since I'm promising you that cocktails are not far away from you, I am merely—I'm going to raise some problems here and not give you an extensive talk.

What do we mean when we say that cities are growing? And what does that meaning of growth, of explosion, have to do with the phenomenon of inequality? One way to look at this, which has tended to be a rather self-serving way in the West, is through the notion of the labor conduit, that is, that cities in the developing world, particularly in Asia, are growing because jobs are migrating from here to there, that's what a labor conduit . . . I'm so sorry. Can you hear me now? OK.

I was saying that one of the images we have of growth that bears on inequality is the notion of the labor conduit, that is, that jobs are moving from here to there, that growth particularly in Asia, but also to some extent in the Middle East, is fueled by job loss here. That's wrong as obviously, as a gross explanation. There are labor conduits, but the more—statistically, the more important phenomenon for job loss in the United States particularly is what's called *job extinction* rather than *job conduits*. And it has much more to do with automation than it does with the migration of labor. This is also an era in which the technology of automating work has spread from the factory to the office. And when you do the numbers, the majority of jobs that Americans are losing, when you have job shrinkage, can be traced much more to factors that have to do with automation than with the Third World, as it were, the natives rising and taking away our work. I'll just give you one number in this. From 1982 to 2002 productivity in the steel industry in the United States rose by 4.6 percent while the numbers of steelworkers employed shrank from 212,000 to 79,000, and almost all of that difference is made up by new techniques of automating steel production. So when we talk about growth, the kinds of massive cities that were evoked this morning, we're looking at a phenomenon which is not in

a way a loss for us, but it is a deeply nonetheless problematic phenomenon because that is not endogenous growth.

A country like China, well China itself, has basically become the low-wage factory workshop for the rest of the world. And what happens is a pattern urbanistically in that kind of low-wage growth, is that you get a cycle where the availability of jobs in the case of China coupled with the devastation of the country's agricultural economy means that people think there's work in cities. There's some of it, but many more people move than the growth in the labor supply can accommodate. Chinese statistics are a notoriously unreliable phenomenon. I'll give you an example from Brazil that makes this clear to you. In São Paulo in 19—I hope I've got my numbers right, I get very dodderly at the end of the day—I think in 1975, São Paulo was 8 million people, and the numbers of people who lacked full-time employment was 7.2 percent. In 2000, São Paulo was 14 million people and the numbers of people who lacked employment were 15.6 percent, and that slack is not made up by the informal economy.

What I'm trying to say to you about this first point is that yes, we are having a massive urban explosion in the world, but it is accompanied by an old-fashioned capitalist problem, which is the specter of uselessness. And when you see those graphs like the woman from SOM [Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill] put up in the morning of this enormous pattern of urban growth, you're not looking at something that's necessarily vigorous, you're looking at a kind of fragility which I think marks the condition of this urban explosion today. So that's the first point I wanted to make to you, that growth is fragile, that what's been exported from the West in the development of these megacities in the specter of uselessness.

The second point I'd like to make to you has to do with the urban geography of inequality today. In the last thirty years, particularly since the collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreements, the global investment has been a force behind spatial homogeneity. What I mean by that is the following: that buildings in cities have become increasingly traded on the global stage as commodities. This has been, as I say, the whole pattern of global finance has made it possible for people around the world to buy urban space, and what they tend to buy is a number, that is, a square foot of something. The kind of investment in what were described as architectural objects this morning is trivial. Most of my students—and I just finished some work on this—most of the investment that goes into buildings goes into, basically, floors that people buy and sell behind the skin of more or less interesting architectural buildings. So that— I'm sorry, this is actually a point I wanted to make very briefly—one of the results of this kind of global trade in urban buildings has been to put not only a pressure of homogeneity on the buildings themselves, but also to begin to homogenize urban spaces. When we talk about gentrification in Western context, we're talking about a small instance of a much larger phenomenon, which is: safe investments are in relatively known environments, and global investors—as I said we just completed doing this work—tend to prefer homogeneous neighborhoods to heterogeneous ones. One of the consequences of this is to create a phenomenon that's sometimes called *cloned cities*. (I don't like that word because it's too simple.) It creates a situation and what you get in the geography of cities where there's large amounts of world investment is a kind of gradation of zones of building, so that next to upper-class communities you'll have upper middle-class communities, up to middle-middle communities, and so on. That pattern of investment means that the

kind of jaggedness, fragmentariness, disruptive quality of one kind of urban space being juttied up right against another. The famous instance in New York was the north and south of Ninety-sixth Street on the East Side, right? Incredible poverty on one side, incredible wealth on the other. That kind of disjunction is being erased by a kind of, when global investment is operating, by a kind of push to create a more modulated environment which is more protected for investment. And in this sense the way cities are developing under globalization is regressive, back to the kinds of models of cities made by the Chicago School of Burgess, our friend, before the First World War, that is, where you have rings of development in which there aren't sharp breaks, sharp caesura, surprises, difference in the sense of sudden rupture. So I would say in that second sense that the problem that we're facing today is not cloned cities in the sense that every city looks the same, but that the forces of global investment—which are investment in something that is known, quantifiable as a quantity of land, given at a certain grade—are meaning that we are getting cities in which the experience of differences, of provocation, is growing less by a kind of regress to a model of the city that looks very much like the kind of zoned graduation that the Chicago School studied a century ago.

The third thing I want to say to you, you should never believe a university professor when he says he's going to be brief. But the third thing I want to say to you, I want to dwell on a little bit more, and that is how today the class structure of cities is changing. The old lens for measuring inequality was to look from the poverty-stricken bottom up, that is, to make measures of deprivation and inequality from starting from the bottom. My own view as an urbanist is that today we need a different kind of optic to—thank you for turning that off—that today we need a different kind of optic for measuring inequality, that is, we need to be able to measure from the center to the top, as well as from the bottom to the middle. And the reason for this is that one of the most striking aspects of what this global economy has been doing to cities, indeed to the labor force as a whole, is to create ever more stagnation in the center, in the dead center, of the class structure while extremes of wealth grow at the very top. This is not a phenomenon of immiseration. I mean one of the . . . I'm an old fashioned socialist, you know, I want to believe that capitalism is a bad thing. It has been a very good thing for immigrants in cities, the changes in capitalism in the last twenty years. I don't want to go down that rabbit hole. But what has happened is that the middle quintile has stagnated, both its income gains and its wealth gains have remained largely stagnant, while those of the top quintile, in particular the top 5 percent, have grown enormously. In the U.S., for instance, the real income of the middle quintile in the thirty largest cities is just where it was in 1980, whereas the top quintile has expanded by 14 percent, these are wealth gains, and the top 5 percent has expanded 200 percent.

Now this is an urban problem. It's an urban problem because that middle class has to compete for the same services and education as those on the top quintile. And you know what the competition is going to be like. They're disabled from doing that. They compete not only for education, for healthcare, and for housing. And in all those cases, as you as New Yorkers know very well, we know the same thing in London, that basically the market tries to set all prices by what the most expensive real estate is, that is, to elevate prices and find buyers for that.

So the problem is that the middle is disabled by this stagnation, particularly in cities where it's competing for services and public goods with the top, and that is a

phenomenon that has I think radically changed the culture of inequality, that change in class structure, the culture of inequality in the modern city. One way to think about it is that it puts a kind of new configuration around the terms *public* and *private*. Essentially the private realm of those in that top quintile is able either to colonize or to enervate the public realm that is available to the middle-middle class. So in that sense, looking forward, we need to have a different way of thinking about the pains of inequality, that that pain is mostly suffered by people who are relatively immobile, that simply calculating income is no longer a sufficient way to understand what inequality is, and particularly by focusing from the bottom up. Now I don't mean the problems of poverty don't matter. What I do mean to say is that the experience of inequality for middle-class people is becoming sharper, and that it is an experience that is very difficult for people to interpret and name themselves.

In the United States the way, the conservative way, of dealing with that is of course to promise mobility upwards, and that promise, as always in these things, is most attractive to those people whose actual experience is one of stagnation rather than entitlement.

So just to sum this up—I'm sorry this is just so brief—to understand what it means to talk about urban inequality today, first on a macro scale, we have to say we are in a period that has unleashed an enormous economic dynamism around the world. It's wrong to explain the operations of that dynamism in countries like China or India as somehow the result of energy leaving the United States. Work is being extinguished here. It's a different kind of problem. You can have a very dynamic economy in the U.S. with ever fewer workers.

For those in the developing parts of the world, growth is also something which is not the same as vigor, and that is because demographic increase is preceding apace much greater than actual jobs for the people who come to cities, so that for them the specter of uselessness is a kind of *arrière pensée* a kind of background to the notion of more.

I tried to describe to you a little what's happening to the urban geography of inequality, and it has to do with what happens when you have global investors investing in places they don't know anything about except the square footage of buildings. The result of that is not simply homogenized architecture, it's also this kind of modulated view of, or desire for, urban space itself which creates an actually backward-looking city in which rupture is eliminated for the sake of the more economic, slow gradation.

And finally I've just tried to indicate to you in this very, very crude way what's happening to the class structure of modern cities. Measuring class from the bottom up prohibits us from an optic which understands that basically the forces of this new capitalism paralyze middle-class groups in the center relative to those at the top. And the fruits of that inequality are the ability of that upper class to either colonize or to enervate a public realm which they share with the middle class. Thank you very much.

Lisa Anderson: Thank you both very much. We're going to have time for about two questions probably, so collect your wits. I want to invite, however, Professor Chatterjee to respond to Richard Sennett's observations, in a sense from the

perspective of the history of the twenty-first century, which you said you weren't going to write. But there's a lot of rhetoric, and I think some reality, to the notion that globalization is yet an iteration of a process that was really—we used to call it imperialism, and that some of the things echo backwards, your comments about growth being fragile, that this isn't a kind of vigorous growth. What I'm asking you is, Is that true of Calcutta? Can you say that the charming colonial architecture was a kind of homogenization? You do say that the middle was kind of trapped. It seems to me that what we're hearing about the beginning of the twenty-first century actually from the perspective of Calcutta is not unfamiliar.

Partha Chatterjee: Yes, in fact I would actually completely agree with what Richard just said about two things. One, the argument that the relatively immobile population is in the middle, that they are increasingly becoming—I describe that as redundant to the new economy, which is exactly to say that they're useless. Now when I say it's the middle, it's part of, you might say, the lower-middle classes, which were functional in some sense, often in relation to the so-called informal economy. This is where—I described this in terms of what I talked about the refugee populations who come into the city after independence—a very large part of them actually find a place in the city precisely in this informal economy, and as I said, that they were given a place in the city which was not quite the place of proper citizens, and yet it was recognized that they had a function in the city, they were needed in the city, and they needed to be governed.

Now what is happening with the new form of production—and it's not necessarily in the case of Calcutta, unlike the Chinese cities that we were talking about, it's not necessarily outsource manufacturing so much, it's much more. And this is the Indian pattern, which is services, particularly what is called *IT-enabled services*. So all of this in relation to software and the other, which therefore effectively means that the populations which are, you know, this is not a move from rural to urban populations at all. The new jobs that are being created are created for people who are already urban, because you require that kind of secondary education and often technical education. So it's usually people who are either in the city or moving from one urban area to another. But the people who are becoming completely dysfunctional were precisely the people who would've in the old forms of manufacturing—all of the informal sectors, the so-called informal sectors of manufacturing—which were never properly organized industry, but small-scale, often household industries of different kinds, which were really where a lot of people found employment, and that is precisely what's becoming irrelevant. So that's exactly what I would agree with.

The second thing is the paralyzing, as you say, of middle-class leadership, and this I think is much more significant in terms of what I was describing as the story of the emergence of a kind of nationalist postcolonial elite, and their role both politically as well as a kind of moral, intellectual leadership of the urban space. Now this is where very often the new—and this is entirely often a technocratic—elite, and in the Indian case this is most clearly seen in a city like Bangalore, for instance, which is really the information technology capital. This is almost like Silicon Valley in one city. And in a city like Bangalore where you have entire areas which are upper-middle-class areas where the local residents actually refuse municipal services, they say we don't need it, we'll provide it on our own, because we should have nothing to do with all these politicians, and political body, and parties, and so on. There are actual cases where they've refused things like inoculation; in fact some people are apparently making a

move to say we'll have our own water supply, we don't need this. This is the new kind of form that one is getting in many of these cities. Of course the gated-community kinds of things that you find in cities like São Paulo, which is, there's partly security, but exactly what you are saying, that in a sense is creating an urban space which is not fragmentary, where there is, you know, which is just completely, you know, graded into secluded spaces.

Lisa Anderson: OK, thank you. We are professors, we're going to go over time a little bit.